Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I by Countryman, Vern




Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I
Vern Countryman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Countryman, Vern, "Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I" (1973). Minnesota Law Review. 2459.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2459
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I
Vern Countryman*
Since the mid-1930's the Bankruptcy Act' has contained pro-
visions authorizing assumption or rejection of executory con-
tracts, including unexpired leases, of the bankrupt or debtor.
To some extent, these provisions codified and changed doctrine
which the bankruptcy courts had previously developed without
statutory aid. To a large degree, they were inspired by diffi-
culties which had developed in connection with real estate leases
because "the law as to leases is not a matter of logic in vacuo; it
is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke." 2 How-
ever, since some of the problems of leases are unique and have
been extensively treated elsewhere,3 this Article will focus on
executory contracts other than leases. The treatment of leases
will be considered only when it seems helpful in the solution of
problems involving other executory contracts.
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Part 11 of this Article
will appear in Volume 58 of the Minnesota Law Review.
1. U.S.C. Title 11. Since U.S.C. section numbers do not corres-
pond to the section numbers of the Act as enacted, I will refer herein-
after only to the section numbers of the Act.
2. Holmes, J., in Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S.
603, 605 (1918).
3. See Clark, Foley & Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts
and Leases by Receivers, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1111 (1933); Creedon & Zin-
man, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAw. 1391(1971); Gottesman, The Onus of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:
Focus on Vendees and Lessors, 4 PRAc. LAw., April, 1958, at 65; Jacobson,
Lessor's Bankruptcy: The Draftsman's Response to the Tenant's Plight,
1 REAL EsT. L.J. 152 (1972); Meck, Railroad Leases and Reorganization:
II, 49 YALE L.J. 1401 (1940); Meck & Masten, Railroad Leases and Reor-
ganization: 1, 49 YALE L.J. 626 (1940); Newman, Rent Claims in Bank-
ruptcy and Corporate Reorganization, 43 CoLuM. L. REv. 317 (1943);
Roeder, Landlords, Bankruptcy, and 77B, 23 CoRN. L.Q. 284 (1938);
Schwabacher & Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy, 33 CoLum. L.
REv. 213 (1933); Shanker, The Treatment of Executory Contracts and
Leases in Bankruptcy Chapter X and XI Proceedings, 18 PRAc. LAW.,
April, 1972, at 15; Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. Cnm L. REv. 467 (1964); Stanley, Lease-
hold Rights in Bankruptcy and Equity Proceedings, 29 Ky. IJ. 301
(1940); Note, Provability of Landlords' Claims in Bankruptcy, 2 U. Cmr.
L. REv. 629 (1935); Note, Landlord's Claims in Bankruptcy and Reor-
ganization, 26 VA. L. REv. 1052 (1940); Note, Lessee Operation of Re-




Long before the English Bankruptcy Act contained any ex-
press provisions on the subject, the courts had concluded that
the assignee in bankruptcy taking title to the bankrupt's prop-
erty could elect to abandon, rather than retain, that which was
worthless or onerous, 4 including leases5 and other executory con-
tracts.6 Provisions of subsequent English Acts originating in
18697 and providing for "disclaimer" not only of leases and con-
tracts but of "any other property" differ significantly from our
own much later provisions.8
A. THE JUDICIALLY CREATED DOCTRINE OF ABANDONMENT
Our Supreme Court first considered the matter in a case
arising under the Bankruptcy Act of 18679 which presented the
question whether the bankruptcy assignees, who were vested
"by operation of law" with the bankrupt's title to all nonexempt
property,' 0 had thereby acquired shares of corporate stock held
by the bankrupt and the consequent liability for corporate debts
which state law imposed because of the 'defective incorporation
of the issuer. On the basis of the English practice, the Court
stated, "It has long been a recognized principle of the bankrupt
[sic] laws that the assignees were not bound to accept property
of an onerous or unprofitable character." It also found that the
assignees had done nothing to indicate acceptance of the stock
and concluded that "neither they nor the assets of [the bankrupt]
in their hands are subject to the individual liability of stockhold-
ers for the debt of the corporation.""
4. South Staffordshire Ry. v. Burnside, 5 Ex. 129, 155 Eng.
Rep. 56 (1850) (shares of stock liable to assessment).
5. Bourdillon v. Dalton, 1 Esp. 233, 170 Eng. Rep. 340 (1794) (real
estate lease).
6. Gibson v. Carruthers, 151 Eng. Rep. 1061, 8 M. & W. 321 (Ex.
1841) (contract for sale of goods where buyer became a bankrupt before
delivery of the goods or payment of the price).
7. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, § 23 (1869). An earlier provision dealt
solely with leases. 49 Geo. 3, c. 121, § 19 (1809).
8. See G. FRIDMAN, I. HICKS & E. JOHNSON, BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE 161-65 (1970); R. WILLIAMS, LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANK-
RUPTcY 424-43 (18th ed. 1968); Melville, Disclaimer of Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy, 15 MOD. L. REv. 28 (1952).
9. 14 Stat. 517 (1867).
10. Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631, 634 (1876); Claflin v. House-
man, 93 U.S. 130, 135 (1876).
11. American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 288, 295 (1884). This
decision had been foreshadowed by Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U.S. 20, 31
(1878), holding that creditors of a bankrupt could not maintain an
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The notion that acceptance, rather than abandonment, re-
quired some affirmative indication from the bankruptcy assignee
was adhered to in a later case involving the bankrupt's seats on
exchanges, which, by the rules of the exchanges, could not be
used until the bankrupt's debts to other members had been
paid. These debts far exceeded what could have been realized
from a sale of the seats. The bankruptcy assignees did nothing
to indicate acceptance of the exchange seats until twelve years
after their appointment and eight years after a Supreme Court
decision in another case 12 had held that such an exchange seat
passed to a bankruptcy assignee subject to the limitation on its
use. During this time the now discharged bankrupt paid the
balances of his debts to fellow exchange members. When the
bankruptcy assignees then sought to claim and sell the seats,
their claim was rejected. The "masterly inactivity" of the as-
signees was characterized as "sedulously avoiding for years any
action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance because the Bankruptcy Act
of 1867 gave the bankruptcy assignee title to all property conveyed by
the bankrupt in fraud of creditors. The decision was said not to leave
the creditors without a remedy. The assignee had an option to abandon
or accept the cause of action and, if he "should erroneously or un-
wisely fail" to accept, the creditors could apply to the bankruptcy court
"to compel him to carry out their wishes." Since the doctrine of aban-
donment was later to be applied to equity receiverships (see text ac-
companying notes 22 et seq., infra), it seems fair to say that a possible
case for its application was presented earlier but that neither court nor
counsel recognized the occasion. In Express Co. v. Railroad Co., 99 U.S.
191, 194, 200-01 (1878), the express company had made an unsecured
loan to the railroad company in return for a contract which entitled the
express company, until the loan was fully repaid, to have its shipments
carried by the railroad company at a specified rate, the freight charges
to be applied in discharge of the loan. When the railroad company went
into receivership and the receiver refused further express company ship-
ments "unless upon conditions whereby said contract was virtually
surrendered or ignored," the express company sought specific perform-
ance of its contract. While indicating that such a contract in some cir-
cumstances might be specifically enforceable, the Court denied relief on
alternate grounds. First, the contract provided that it should terminate
upon full repayment of the loan, which "might be made immediately
upon the rendition of the decree" so that the "action of the court would
thus become a nullity." Second,
[a] specific performance by the receiver would be a form of
satisfaction or payment which he cannot be required to make.
As well might he be decreed to satisfy the appellant's demand
by money, as by the service sought to be enforced. Both be-
long to the lien-holders, and neither can be thus diverted.
As will be developed in text accompanying notes 86 et seq., infra, this
would be a proper case for application of the doctrine of abandonment
if the contract were construed, as it might have been, to require the
express company to give to the railroad company all of its shipments
between points served by the latter.
12. Hyde v. Woods, 94 U.S. 523 (1876).
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responsibility" while knowingly "allowing the bankrupt, by use
of after acquisitions, to create a value not theretofore possessed."
Hence, "[t] heir conduct can be viewed in no other light than that
of an election not to accept these rights as property of the es-
tate.",'
3
A different rule was applied, however, when the bankrupt
failed to schedule a cause of action among his assets, with the con-
sequence that the assignee did not learn of the asset until a post-
bankruptcy creditor levied on the proceeds of the cause of action
some twelve years after bankruptcy. Under such circumstances,
it was concluded that, since "the assignee should not have been
held to have exercised the right of choice between proscuting
the claim and abandoning it," he should be allowed to take the
proceeds of the claim from the levying creditor.14
A similar result was later reached under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, which pursuant to § 70a(5) gives the trustee
the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the pe-
tition [to all nonexempt] property, including rights of action,
which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means
have transferred or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized,
impounded, or sequestered. 15
A bankrupt who failed to schedule a claim for usury was later
held not entitled to prosecute it. While bankruptcy trustees
13. Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U.S. 1, 14, 15 (1891).
14. Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 518 (1896). Cf. Sessions v.
Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 39 (1892), where the bankrupt failed to schedule
a patent owned by him and the bankruptcy case was closed without any
reference to the patent. A prospective purchaser later inquired of the
former bankruptcy assignee about buying the patent and was told that
the assignee had been discharged and had no power to act and that he
should deal with the bankrupt. When this advice was followed and
the purchaser from the bankrupt later sued another for patent infringe-
ment, the infringer was held not entitled to challenge the purchaser's
title. Of the former assignee's conversation with the purchaser, the
Court said:
A plainer election not to accept can hardly be imagined. Grant-
ing that up to that time he had known nothing about the
patent, it was his duty to inquire into the matter if he had any
thought of accepting it, and not to mislead the [purchaser] by
referring him to the bankrupt as the proper person to apply to.
But the Court noted also that "no claim to this property is now made by
the assignee, but ... his alleged title to it is set up by a third person,
who confessedly has no interest in it himself."
15. Prior to Chandler Act amendment in 1938 (52 Stat. 879), § 70a
(5) gave the trustee "the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was
adjudged a bankrupt" to all nonexempt "property which prior to the
filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him." 30 Stat. 565-66 (1898).
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were said to have "a reasonable time" to decide whether to ac-
cept or abandon property, and if they decided to abandon it "the
bankrupt could assert title thereto," there could be no abandon-
ment "when the trustee is ignorant of the existence of the prop-
erty and has had no opportunity to make an election."' a
In a later case,17 an abandonment by the trustee took place
with the approval of the bankruptcy court and, therefore, in-
volved the consequences of the abandonment rather than the
question of whether an abandonment had in fact occurred. The
property abandoned was national bank stock, which, though
fully paid, was subject to assessment up to its par value to pay
the debts of the bank. Before the stockholder's bankruptcy the
Comptroller of the Currency had declared the bank insolvent, a
receiver had been appointed to wind up its affairs, and it had be-
come apparent that a full assessment would be made on all
shares. In his bankruptcy proceeding, the stockholder had sched-
uled his liability to assessment on the shares and had received
a discharge before the assessment on the shares was formally
made.
In a subsequent suit by the bank's receiver to enforce the
assessment, the stockholder asserted the following defenses: (1)
that he had been divested of the shares, and hence of the liabil-
ity, by his bankruptcy proceeding, and (2) that any liability he
might have had was covered by the bankruptcy discharge. He
lost on the first defense but prevailed on the second. The Court
concluded that the former defense failed because "[w]hatever ti-
tle or inchoate interest may have passed to the trustee was extin-
guished" by his abandonment of the shares.18 In order to rule
on the second defense, however, it was necessary to fix the time
when the revesting of the title to and the liability on the shares
occurred, because under § 17a of the Bankruptcy Act only prov-
able debts are discharged and the Court had earlier read § 63a to
mean that only liabilities in existence at the time the bankruptcy
petition was filed were provable.1 9 The Court stated that the
revesting occurred "by relation as of the filing of the petition,"
invoking the "precise analogy... in the law of gifts and lega-
cies" under which
[aicceptance is presumed, but rejection leaves the title by re-
lation as if the gift had not been made. For the purposes of the
16. First Natl Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1905).
17. Brownv. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1937).
18. Id. at 602.
19. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913).
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case at hand the result will be the same whether title is con-
ceived of as remaining in the bankrupt or as afterwards revert-ing.2O
It concluded that the liability was sufficiently non-contingent so
that the claim was provable in the bankruptcy proceeding even
though the formal assessment came later. The Court therefore
held the liability was covered by the stockholder's bankruptcy
discharge.
21
Meanwhile, the option to abandon or accept property had
also been extended to equity receivers. In the first case making
this extension, the Court expressed some doubt concerning the
propriety of the extension since such receivers are merely cus-
todians of, and do not take title to, the debtor's property. 2- But,
assuming that the receivers had the option, the Court concluded
that they had not elected to adopt the debtor railroad's long term
lease on track by operating over it for fourteen months, without
producing enough income to pay any rent, before surrendering
the track to the lessor when the receivership court promptly
granted the lessor's first request to repossess. 23 The receivers
were held entitled to a "reasonable time" to make their election
and were found to have done nothing to indicate an acceptance
of the lease. 2
4
20. Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1937) (citations omit-
ted).
21. Id.
22. Quincy, Mo. & Pac. R.R. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1892).
(1892).
23. Id. at 101.
24. Id. See also St. Joseph & St. Louis R.R. v. Humphreys, 145
U.S. 105 (1892), reaching the same conclusion with respect to an-
other leased line of the same debtor. Here the result was foreshadowed
by Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313, 321, 322 (1892), involving
a contract under which a railroad in receivership had previously
leased rolling stock at a stipulated annual rental and had agreed to (1)
haul all freight of the lessor at specified rates, (2) apply the freight
charges to the rentals, and (3) purchase the leased property at a
specified price on a date which followed the appointment of the re-
ceiver. Two months after the receiver's appointment and six weeks
after the purchase date, the lessor sought to compel the receiver to
make the purchase. However, the receiver was allowed to invoke a
provision in the contract which was read to relieve the debtor of the
obligation to purchase and to entitle it to return the property if on the
purchase date it was "unable to purchase." The receiver was said to be
entitled to a reasonable time to elect whether to adopt the contract or to
"decline to assume this obligation, and return the property" pursuant to
the terms of the contract. He was, however, held obligated to pay
"the stipulated rental for it so long as he used" the property, but with
the correlative right to recover freight charges withheld by the lessor
in excess of that rental.
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In the following year, another lessor in the same receiver-
ship presented the same question and obtained the same answer,
save that he was allowed a priority claim for the reasonable
value of use and occupancy of the line by the receiver during the
period when the bondholders were unsuccessfully opposing the
lessor's attempt to repossess. However, by this time doubts
about the application of the doctrine of abandonment to equity
receivers had vanished:
The general rule applicable to this class of cases is undis-
puted that an assignee or receiver is not bound to adopt the con-
tracts, accept the leases, or otherwise step into the shoes of his
assignor, if in his opinion it would be unprofitable or undesir-
able to do so; and he is entitled to a reasonable time to elect
whether to adopt or repudiate such contracts. If he elects to
adopt a lease, the receiver becomes vested with the title to the
leasehold interest, and a privity of estate is thereby created be-
tween the lessor and the receiver, by which the latter becomes
liable upon the covenant to pay rent.25
Attempts by the draftsmen of leases to limit or eliminate
the option of the receiver or bankruptcy trustee met with only
modest success. A provision forfeiting the leasehold if the lessee
"shall assign [his] lease .. .or if said lessee's interest therein
shall be sold under execution or other legal process"2 30 was held
inoperative when the lessee was put into bankruptcy on an invol-
untary petition, since the passage of the lessee's estate to the
bankruptcy trustee "was by operation of law and not by the act
of the bankrupt."2 7 Neither did it operate on the trustee's later
sale of the leasehold: that was not a "voluntary assignment by
the lessee, nor a sale of the lessee's interest, but [a sale] of the
trustee's interest held under the bankruptcy proceedings for the
benefit of creditors." 28
In a later case, a provision that the filing of a bankruptcy
petition by or against the lessee should ipso facto terminate the
lease and entitle the lessor to recover the rental reserved in the
lease for the balance of the term was held to be an unreasonable
attempt to liquidate damages and invalid as a penalty.2 9 How-
ever, an ipso facto clause which fixed the landlord's damages at
the difference between the present value of the future rent re-
served under the lease and the present value of the fair rental
25. United States Trust Co. v. Wabash Western Ry., 150 U.S.
287, 299-300 (1893).
26. Gazlay v. Williams, 210 U.S. 41 (1908).
27. Id. at 47.
28. Id.
29. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust Co., 280 U.S. 224 (1930).
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value of the premises for the balance of the term was held effec-
tive to terminate the lease and to give the lessor a measurable
claim provable in bankruptcy.30 And a covenant providing for
the same measure of damages on any termination of the lease was
held operative to measure the landlord's damage claim in a re-
ceivership proceeding after the receiver had rejected the lease."'
But the Court was at pains to point out that the claim was not
for rent, which "issues from the land, is not due until the rent
day, and is due in respect of the enjoyment of the premises let."'82
Rather, it was a claim based on "a personal covenant that liqui-
dated the damages upon a footing that was familiar and fair." 83
Under a lease lacking such a covenant, the landlord who re-
entered and terminated the lease on the receiver's rejection of it
was held to have no claim provable in the receivership.8 4
In 1934, the Supreme Court confirmed a series of lower court
decisions holding that a provision in § 63a(4) of the Bankruptcy
Act for proof of claims based on contract was not intended to
cover a landlord's claim under a covenant in the lease which gave
him the option to re-enter and relet the premises and to recover
the difference between the rent reserved in the lease and the
amount received from reletting. 35 In part the decision was based
on the conclusion that Congress had adopted the lower courts'
construction in failing to alter § 63a(4) in several subsequent
amendments to the Act.36 It was also based on the notion that
the exercise of the landlord's option brought into existence a
"new contract" which was not in existence at bankruptcy and
hence could not provide the basis for a provable claim. 7 One
year later, a similar covenant was held not to give a provable
claim to a lessor who had re-entered, but had not relet before
bankruptcy and following rejection by an equity receiver. Since
his claim was to be reduced, and might be extinguished, by
what he received on reletting, "it was, at the time the petition
in bankruptcy was filed, uncertain, a mere matter of speculation,
whether any liability ever would arise. '38
30. Irving Trust Co. v. A.W. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 296 (1934).
31. William Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597 (1918).
32. Id. at 601.
33. Id. at 602.
34. Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603 (1918).
35. Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320
(1934).
36. Id. at 336.
37. Id. at 338.
38. Miller v. Irving Trust Co., 296 U.S. 256, 258 (1935).
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The consequences for parties whose leases did not contain
appropriate clauses were unsettling. If the claim was not prov-
able the lessor took nothing from the bankrupt estate. But if the
claim was not provable, it was also for that reason nondischarge-
able. These results were disturbing to noncorporate bankrupt
lessees who remained liable for future rent and to the lessors of
corporate bankrupt tenants who could look forward to realizing
little on their undischarged claims against the corporate shells.
B. CONGRESSIONAL TREATiAENTm oF ExEcuToRY CoNTRAcTs
Congress began to rectify the situation in 1933 with the en-
actment of § 77 of the Act, providing a statutory procedure for
the reorganization of interstate railroads, theretofore accom-
plished by means of equity receivership. 39 Two years later, § 77
was extensively revised.40 That section contemplates that execu-
tory contracts, including unexpired leases, may be rejected either
by the trustee in reorganization or by the terms of the plan
of reorganization. It further provides that, in either event, "any
person injured" by the rejection shall be "deemed to be a cred-
itor ... to the extent of the actual damage or injury determined
in accordance with principles obtaining in equity proceedings."4'
Section 77B, added in 193442 to provide for the reorganization of
other corporations, followed a similar pattern, as did its 1938
successor, Chapter X. Chapters XI, XII and XIII, also enacted
in 1938, continued this pattern.
These provisions, of course, did not touch the problem in a
straight bankruptcy case. Congress approached this matter in
1934 by enacting § 63a(7) to provide for proof of "claims for dam-
ages respecting executory contracts including future rents." 43
In the general Chandler Act revision of 1938, this provision be-
came § 63a(9)44 authorizing proof of "claims for anticipatory
breach of contracts, executory in whole or in part, including un-
39. 47 Stat. 1474 (1933).
40. 49 Stat. 911 (1935).
41. Section 74, added by 47 Stat. 1467 (1933) to authorize composi-
tions and extensions of secured and unsecured debts for noncorporate
debtors (and destined to be replaced in 1938 with Chapters XI, XII and
XII), dealt with the matter much more simply. It merely included in
§ 74a among the other claims that could be dealt with, "whether or not
such claims would otherwise constitute provable claims under this
Act," a "claim for future rent."
42. 48 Stat. 911 (1934).
43. 48 Stat. 924,991 (1934).
44. 52 Stat. 873 (1938).
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expired leases of real or personal property."' 4r The Chandler Act
also contributed two new provisions bearing on the problem.
One provision added § 63a and was designed to reconcile the no-
tion of post-petition rejection giving rise to a provable claim with
the notion that only claims in existence at the time the petition is
filed are provable.4 6 That section, as later amended, provides
that "[n]otwithstanding any State law to the contrary, the re-
jection of an executory contract or unexpired lease, as provided
in this Act, shall constitute a breach of such contract or lease as of
the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under
this Act."47
The other provision added a new § 70b. As later amended,
it reads in part:
The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract,
including an unexpired lease of real property, within sixty days
after the adjudication or within thirty days after the qualifica-
tion of the trustee, whichever is later, but the court may for
cause shown extend or reduce the time. Any such contract or
lease not assumed or rejected within that time shall be deemed
to be rejected.4"
45. In both versions, in language not significantly changed in 1938,
this provision made clear that there was continued latitude for the
lease draftsman by providing "It]hat the claim of a landlord for
damages for injury resulting from the rejection of an unexpired lease
of real estate or for damages or indemnity under a covenant contained
in such lease shall in no event be allowed in an amount exceeding the
rent reserved ... for the year next succeeding the date" when the
landlord recovered possession, "plus an amount equal to the unpaid rent
accrued, without acceleration, up to such date." 52 Stat. 873 (1938).
46. See text accompanying note 19 supra. As I have argued else-
where, reconciliation is necessary only because the requirement that a
claim must be in existence when the petition is filed is confused with
a nonrequirement that the claim be matured at that time. Country-
man, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 407, 413 (1972).
47. 52 Stat. 873 (1938); 66 Stat. 426 (1952). Before the 1952 amend-
ment, this section provided that rejection should constitute a breach
"as of the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, or of the
original petition under chapter X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act."
48. 52 Stat. 880 (1938); 76 Stat. 571 (1962). Prior to the 1962
amendment the first sentence of § 70b read: "Within sixty days after
the adjudication, the trustee shall assume or reject any executory con-
tract, including unexpired leases of real property: Provided, however,
That the court may for cause shown extend or reduce such period
of time."
The Supreme Court has provided in Bankruptcy General Order 15,
28 U.S.C., that the bankruptcy court may order that no trustee need be
appointed if the schedule of a voluntary bankrupt discloses no assets
and if no creditor appears at the first meeting. In that event, § 70b
provides that "any such contract or lease shall be deemed to be re-
jected within thirty days after the date of the order directing that a
trustee be not appointed." The originators of this proposal explained
[Vol. 57:439
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Thus all of the provisions added to the Bankruptcy Act since
1933 have one characteristic in common-they deal only with
executory contracts, including unexpired leases. With one mi-
nor exception,49 the Act contains no provisions dealing expressly
with the abandonment of other property. That is left to court-
created doctrine. Our concern here, however, is not with such
other property or with unexpired leases, 0 but with other execu-
that it was "intended to protect the interests of the other party to the
contract or lease." "if. .. no trustee has been appointed within such
period, it is only fair that the other party should know his rights and
have the status of the executory contract or lease settled." ANALYSIS OF
HR. 12889, House Judiciary Committee Print, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
227 (1936).
49. In 1928, § 70a(2), which gives the trustee title to the bankrupt's
nonexempt patents, copyrights and trademarks, was amended to give
him title to applications for these property rights, as well. But a pro-
viso was added which, as slightly revised in 1938, reads:
That in case the trustee, within thirty days after appointment
and qualification, does not notify the applicant for a patent,
copyright, or trade-mark of his election to prosecute the appli-
cation to allowance or rejection, the bankrupt may apply to the
court for an order revesting him with the title thereto, which
petition shall be granted unless for cause shown by the trustee
the court grants further time to the trustee for making such
election; and such applicant may, in any event, at any time pe-
tition the court to be revested with such title in case the trustee
shall fail to prosecute such application with reasonable dili-
gence; and the court, upon revesting the bankrupt with such
title, shall direct the trustee to execute proper instruments of
transfer to make the same effective in law and upon the rec-
ords.
44 Stat. 667 (1926); 52 Stat. 879-80 (1938).
50. Most of the learning with respect to leases relates to real prop-
erty leases. Save for patent license agreements involving use of pat-
ented items to be considered later, the cases dealing with leases of
personalty can be summed up in a footnote. A few older cases held
that the lessor had no provable claim for future rents in a straight
bankruptcy proceeding where he had repossessed the property because
of the lessee's prebankruptcy default. In re Miller Bros. Grocery Co.,
219 F. 851 (6th Cir. 1915); In re Merwin & Willoughby Co., 206 F. 116
(N.D.N.Y. 1913). Other cases came to the same conclusion where the
lessor had repossessed under a provision of the lease entitling him to
do so in the event of the lessee's bankruptcy. Lamson ConsoL Store
Service Co. v. Bowland, 114 F. 639 (6th Cir. 1902); In re Quaker Drug
Co., 204 F. 689 (W.D. Wash. 1913). They are all based on interpreta-
tions of the leases but are obviously influenced by analogy to the real
property lease where future rents "issue from the land" and are not
collectible unless the lessee has had the use of the land. See text ac-
companying note 32 supra. The Sixth Circuit. however, later rejected
the real property analogy in a receivership case where the lessor had
repossessed under a provision of the lease entitling him to do so on
the insolvency of the lessee and allowed proof of claims for loss of
future rents under a liquidated damages clause. Lamson Co. v. Elliott-
Taylor-Wolfenden Co., 25 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1928). Cf. In re Gelino's, Inc.,
43 F.2d 832 (E.D. fl. 1930), appeal dismissed, 51 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 659 (1931). Electrical Prod. ConsoL v. Sweet,
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tory contracts. This brings us to a threshold inquiry: what is an
executory contract, other than unexpired lease, which may be
assumed or rejected in bankruptcy proceedings?
II. WHAT IS AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT?
As Professor Williston has said, "All contracts to a greater
or less extent are executory. When they cease to be so, they
cease to be contracts." 5' 1 But that expansive meaning can hardly
be given to the term as used in the Bankruptcy Act5 2 or even to
the Act's occasional alternative reference to contracts "executory
in whole or in part."53 The concept of the "executory contract"
in bankruptcy should be defined in the light of the purpose for
which the trustee is given the option to assume or reject. Similar
to his general power to abandon or accept other property, this
is an option to be exercised when it will benefit the estate. A
83 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1936), also rejected the real estate analogy and al-
lowed proof of claims in a straight bankruptcy case where the lessors
had repossessed either for prebankruptcy default or because the trustee
rejected the leases. See also Bassett v. Claude Neon Fed. Co., 65 F.2d
526 (10th Cir. 1933). Mathews v. Butte Mach. Co., 286 F. 801 (9th Cir.
1923), allowed a lessor of personalty a first priority claim for admin-
istration expense for the receiver's use of leased machinery where the
lease expired seven months after the receiver was appointed and before
he had either assumed or rejected it.
More recently, American A. & B. Coal Corp. v. Leonardo Arriva-
bene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 1960), held that where a debtor in
possession under Chapter XI rejects ship charters, which the court
treated as leases of personal property, the shipowners were not en-
titled to first priority claims for administration expense for demurrage
accruing after the filing of the petition and before rejection, where the
debtor in possession made no use of, and the estate did not benefit from,
the vessels. See also In re Rochester Shipbuilding Corp., 32 F. Supp. 98
(W.D.N.Y. 1940), authorizing a bankruptcy trustee of a shipowner to re-
ject a charter despite the fact that the charterer had guaranteed payment
of a ship mortgage and had the right to apply charter hire payments to
the mortgage debt. But the charters involved in both of these cases
were apparently time charters, which are "contracts for the carriage of
goods designated by one person in the ship of another person, who him-
self remains in control of the navigation of the vessel," unlike a demise
or bareboat charter which "shifts the possession and control of the
vessel from one person to another, just as the shoreside lease of real
property shifts many of the incidents of ownership from lessor to les-
see." G. GmIoMRE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 215 (1957).
51. 1 S. WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 14 (3d ed. 1957), quoted in 3A W.
COLLIER, BANKRuPTCY f 63.33 [2], at 1935 (14th ed. 1971).
52. Bankruptcy Act §§ 63c, 70b, 77b (twice), 106(7), 116(1), 202,
216(4), 238b, 238c, 306(4), 313(1), 324(1) (twice), 353, 355(2), 357(2),
376, 378(c), 406(4), 413(1), 424(1) (twice), 458, 461(4), 481, 483(c),
606(5), 613(1), 624(1), 642, 646(6), 666.




fortiori, it should not extend to situations where the only effect
of its exercise would be to prejudice other creditors of the es-
tate.
A. CONTRACTs PERFORMED BY THE NONBANKRUPT
Executory contracts, in the sense in which Professor Willis-
ton spoke, abound in a bankruptcy proceeding. One example is
the contract under which the nonbankrupt party has fully ren-
dered the performance to which the bankrupt is entitled, but
which the bankrupt has performed only partially or not at all
Such a contract will give the nonbankrupt party a provable claim
in the bankruptcy proceeding,5 4 whether it is liquidated or un-
liquidated55 and whether it is absolute or contingent as to lia-
bility.56 The trustee's option to assume or reject should not ex-
tend to such contracts. The estate has whatever benefit it can ob-
tain from the other party's performance and the trustee's rejec-
tion would neither add to nor detract from the creditor's claim
or the estate's liability.57 His assumption, on the other hand,
54. By contrast, a "pure tort" claim is not provable, Schall v.
Comers, 251 U.S. 239 (1920), unless reduced to judgment before bank-
ruptcy so as to be provable under § 63a(1) as a "fixed liability, as
evidenced by a judgment," or unless it constitutes a "right to recover
damages in any action for negligence instituted prior to and pending
at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy" so as to be
provable under § 63a(7). But a tort claim is provable if the claim is of
such a nature that the claimant could prove by "waiving the tort and
standing upon the implied assumpsit," even though he fails to do so.
Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Corp., 293 U.S. 328, 331 (1934) (claim of se-
cured creditor for conversion of collateral); Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U.S.
183 (1907) (claim of unpaid seller of goods that he was induced by
fraud to make the sale); Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904) (claim
by customer for conversion of securities pledged with stockbroker).
55. In Frederic L. Grant Shoe Co. v. W.M. Laird Co., 212 U.S. 445
(1909), an individual with an unliquidated claim for breach of warranty
on the sale of goods was held to qualify as a petitioning creditor under
§ 59b, which then authorized involuntary petitions by creditors with
provable claims of $500 or more where the claim was liquidated at
more than that amount in the debtor's contest of the petition and prior
to his adjudication thereon.
56. Even before the 1938 enactment of § 63a(8), providing for the
proof of "contingent contractual liabilities," a surety's claim on a con-
tract of indemnity with his principal was held provable where the prin-
cipal had defaulted on the underlying obligation before his bankruptcy
although the surety did not pay the resulting damages until after bank-
ruptcy. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549
(1915). So was the liability of an indorser on notes not due at the time
of the indorser's bankruptcy. Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273 (1931).
See also Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598 (1937), discussed in text accom-
panying note 17 supra.
57. It would not affect the allowability of an "unliquidated or con-
tingent claim," which under § 57d is not to be allowed "unless liqui-
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would in no way benefit the estate and would only have the ef-
fect of converting the claim into a first priority expense of ad-
ministration"8 and thus of preferring it over all claims not as-
sumed-a prerogative which the Bankruptcy Act has never been
supposed to have vested in either the trustee or the court.
The cases finding that the nonbankrupt party has fully per-
formed, as far as they go, support this conclusion. A series of
decisions in the Second Circuit hold that the trustee of one who
has guaranteed the obligation of or become a surety for a lessee
of real estate cannot reject his debtor's obligation after the lessee's
default.5 9 As that court analyzed the problem:
In so far as [the contract of suretyship] was an executory con-
tract it was an unilateral obligation to perform the same obli-
gations the lessee had agreed to perform. In all other respects
it was not executory at all but had been performed. Conse-
quently, when the attempted rejection of it was made there was
nothing for the surety in reorganization to reject. What it did
was simply a way of asserting a continued refusal to perform
by one already in default. Nothing was thereby changed and
no new rights arose. It is implicit in the language of the statute
that a rejection of an executory contract involves the relinquish-
ment of some right thought too burdensome to be retained and
not merely the repudiation of an obligation which could in no
circumstances ever be an asset to the debtor.60
The situation for which the statute provides is one in which, in
making a determination whether or not to reject, the advantages
of giving and receiving further performance are to be weighed
against the disadvantages. A guarantor of a lease has no interest
in the lessor's future performance. Such an agreement of guar-
dated or the amount thereof estimated in the manner and within the
time directed by the court" and is not to be allowed at all "if the
court shall determine that it is not capable of liquidation or of reason-
able estimation or that such liquidation or estimation would unduly de-
lay the administration of the estate or any proceeding under this Act."
In the latter event, § 63d provides that the claim "shall not be deemed
provable" and hence will not be discharged under § 17a. Cf. Dunbar v.
Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 345 (1903), deciding before these provisions were
enacted that a former wife's claim under a divorce agreement for
specified monthly payments for life or until she remarried was not prov-
able and not discharged, not because of the difficulty of estimating her
life expectancy, but "because of the innate difficulty, if not impossibil-
ity, of estimating or valuing the particular contingency of widowhood."
58. This consequence of assumption will be discussed in Part II
of this article.
59. Hippodrome Bldg. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 91 F.2d 753 (2d Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 748 (1937) (guarantor in § 77B proceedings;
bankruptcy trustee of lessee had rejected lease); In re Schulte Retail
Stores Corp., 105 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1939) (surety and lessee both in
§ 77B proceedings; lessee had rejected lease); In re Grayson-Robinson
Stores, 321 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1963) (guarantor in Chapter XI proceed-
ings; lessee had defaulted under lease).




anty is not in itself any part of a bargain for future perform-
ance. Rather than having any interest in the lessor's perform-
ance, the guarantor's interest would be better served by non-
performance% since in that event the guarantor would be released
from the obligation which he has undertaken. The agreement
of guaranty is therefore not an executory contract . . . . The
guarantor, by the lessor's execution of the lease, has received all
of the consideration for which he bargained with the lessor. The
contract between them is executed except for the guarantor's
obligation to pay upon default of the lessee. By his "rejection"
the guarantor would be relinquishing no benefits; he would
merely be repudiating his obligations. A guarantor is there-
fore no more entitled to reject his agreement of guaranty than
would any bankrupt be entitled to "reject" his accrued debts.01
In my judgment, the court's approach constitutes an appli-
cation of the right rule to the wrong case due to faulty analysis of
the contractual relationship of lessor-creditor and surety. It
may be correct to say that the surety or guarantor, "by the les-
sor's execution of the lease, has received all of the consideration
for which he bargained with the lessor." But he also has a suffi-
cient interest in the lessor's continuing obligations to the lessee so
that, while the lessor's default would not give him a claim for
damages, the lessor's material default would, as the court recog-
nizes, release the surety or guarantor as well as the lessee.
Therefore these are not contracts under which the lessor has yet
rendered the full performance to which the bankrupt surety is
entitled. These are contracts which the trustee of the surety
might in some cases properly want to assume, depending on the
surety's relationship to the lessee, and are contracts which he
should in other cases be able to reject.
There will be some suretyship contracts under which the
creditor has fully performed at the outset. That would be true
of the surety on a single loan who receives all the performance
he is interested in, not when the lender executes the loan agree-
ment but when he makes the advance to the debtor.12  But in
most, if not all cases, the relationship of surety and lessor is mu-
tually executory for the term of the lease. The lessor's contin-
uing obligations to lessee and surety may be several and it will
be the rare lease, if indeed it is a lease, where he is relieved of
the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. 63
61. In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir.
1963).
62. It would also be true of a continuing guaranty to the extent
that the lender had made a series of loans. Only if he was contractually
obligated to more additional advances in the future would the contract
of the guarantor be executory.
63. 1 Am=cx LAw OF PnoPErM-L § 3.47 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
With even that covenant gone, it is far from clear that what remains is
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Perhaps for this reason the Second Circuit's decisions in
these cases have been ignored by other courts which have
reached the same conclusion where the contract was fully per-
formed by the nonbankrupt party. In re San Francisco Bay Expo-
sition,64 although decided by a Chapter XI court, did not involve
an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act. However, its analysis
is applicable to the Act. In that case, a state savings and loan as-
sociation that owned and operated a hotel had, in order to aid the
financing of the Exposition and in consideration of similar sub-
scriptions by others, agreed in December, 1938, to pay the Expo-
sition a percentage of all of its hotel rentals collected between
March and October, 1939. The Exposition opened for business
in February, 1939; the savings and loan association went into liq-
uidation proceedings under a state commissioner on March 4,
1939, and the Exposition went into Chapter XI proceedings on
October 20, 1939. Before the latter date the state commissioner,
acting under a state statute authorizing him to "disaffirm any
executory contracts (including leases) to which such association
is a party, and disaffirm any partially executed contracts (in-
cluding leases) to the extent that they remain executory," had
notified the Exposition that he disaffirmed the subscription con-
tract. The Chapter XI court held that he had no power to do
so and that the Exposition was entitled to collect from him the
$6,519.04 due under the contract. 5 After noting the similarity
between the state statute and § 70b of the Bankruptcy Act, the
court said:
The Referee [in bankruptcy] assumed that any contract
not completely performed by either party is executory in the
sense which gives rise to the right of disaffirmance. Upon that
assumption he held that the . . . Commissioner could disaffirm
the subscription agreement, because even though the Exposi-
tion had performed, the Commissioner had not; ergo, the con-
tract was executory and the Commissioner could disaffirm. In
a literal sense, executory contracts are, of course, those wherein
performance in whole or in part has not been had .... In
the sense used in both the California statute and the Bank-
ruptcy Act, they . . . are the type of contracts which call for
performance in futuro, such as leases, contracts for electric
power, light, heat, delivery of commodities, services and the
like. Both by State and Federal Statutes, there is vested in
trustees the power to decide whether the performance of such
contracts is beneficial or burdensome. ...
Where, however, the contract has been fully performed by
one party, giving rise to the obligation of payment upon the
a lease. It may be only a license. 2 AlxmicEiAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.77(A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
64. 50 F. Supp. 344, 345-47 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
65. Id. at 347.
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part of the other, renouncement by the party having the obliga-
tion to pay, is equivalent to a breach. If [the savings and loan
association] had borrowed $6,519.04 from a bank and executed
its promissory note therefor, could it disaffirm, prior to maturity,
on the ground that the contract was executory, being still un-
performed by it? Granted the power to disaffirm, it amounts
to a breach and gives rise to the right to recover damages on the
part of the injured party; since the measure of damages for
failure to pay money is equal to the amount that should have
been paid, the right of disaffirmance is illusory. Prior to dis-
affirmance by the Commissioner, [the savings and loan associa-
tion] had received the consideration it expected and the Exposi-
tion agreed to give.
... I conclude that this is not the type of executory con-
tract, which is subject to disaffirmance under the statute. Even
if disaffirmed, the obligation to pay the debt still persists.60
This decision was followed by In re Forney,07 where a mort-
gagee had agreed that the mortgagors could sell the mortgaged
property free of the mortgage in return for the mortgagors' as-
signment, contained in the agreement, to the mortgagee of so
much of the net proceeds of the sale as was necessary to pay the
mortgage debt. After the sale the mortgagors went into bank-
ruptcy. Their trustee took no action with respect to the contract
within the time specified in § 70b 68 and then argued that the con-
tract should be deemed rejected. The court disposed of his argu-
ment stating:
Although the agreement for the sale was not fully performed
at the time of adjudication in that the remaining proceeds had
not been disbursed to the mortgagee,. .. this is not the type of
contractual situation to which [§ 70b] is applicable. The act
necessary to give rise to the obligation to disburse the proceeds
under the agreement, namely the sale of the property free of
the mortgage, had been fully performed. Accordingly, the
agreement was no longer an executory contract within the
meaning of the statute but a partially executed contract, execu-
tory only as to the obligation to transfer the proceeds of the sale
to the mortgagee. Cf. In re San Francisco Bay Exposi-
tion .... 69
Forney, in turn, was regarded as dispositive in Stell Manu-
facturing Co. v. Gilbert,70 where the seller of custom built fur-
niture had received a down payment and had delivered and in-
66. Id. at 346-47 (citations omitted).
67. 299 F.2d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1962).
68. Id. at 507.
69. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
70. 372 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1967). See also In re Kosting, 350 F.
Supp. 1071 (D. Conn. 1972), holding that the trustee of the seller of land
could not assume a contract with a real estate broker, and thus convert
his claim for a commission into a first priority administration expense,
where the broker had fully performed by finding a buyer and obtaining
a binder agreement executed before the seller's bankruptcy.
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stalled the furniture before the bankruptcy of the buyer. The
seller's attempt to reclaim the furniture from the bankruptcy
trustee was unsuccessful. The finding below that title had
passed to the buyer on delivery and acceptance of the goods was
affirmed. The seller's further argument that the trustee must
be deemed to have rejected the contract because he had not as-
sumed it within the time limits fixed by § 70b received a short
answer: "[T]he only thing that remained executory about this
contract was the obligation to pay. Therefore, § 70(b) does not
apply, In Re Forney .... Indeed, a sale of goods, title to which
has passed to buyer, is not executory under Texas law .... ",T7
It seems clear, therefore, that a contract which is executory
only in the sense that it provides the fully performed nonbank-
rupt party with a claim against the bankrupt estate is not one
which may be assumed or rejected. Section 70b and related pro-
visions 72 of the Act are not concerned with claims provable
against the estate under § 63a but with assets of the bankrupt
which pass to the trustee under § 70a. 73 Of course, the nonbank-
rupt party who has fully performed may have provided an asset
which comes into the bankrupt estate and which the trustee will
have the option to abandon or accept, quite apart from the bank-
rupt's liability with respect to it. But if the trustee does accept
the property, he accepts it cum onere, taking its burdens with
its benefits, whether the burden be a liability imposed upon the
71. The last sentence quoted is followed by a citation to two
Texas cases. One gives no support and the other holds that, where
title to the goods has passed to the buyer, he becomes liable for the
price whereas, under an "executory contract of sale" breached by the
buyer, the seller's measure of damages is the difference between the
contract price and the market value of the goods. The sentence and the
citations are, in any event, irrelevant. What constitutes an "executory
contract" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act is no more to be
determined by how the state characterizes the contract for other purposes
than is the meaning of "property" in § 70a(5) to be determined by
state characterization for other purposes. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924). See also Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375(1966), holding that whether property can be "transferred" under
§ 70a (5) is also a federal question.
72. See notes 52 & 53 supra.
73. The originators of § 70b were preoccupied with the prob-
lem of leases, although their proposal dealt with all executory con-
tracts. They explained that their original thought was to include it "as
a proviso in [§ 70a], for the reason that it involves the title of the
trustee to the property interests of landlords or tenants who become
bankrupt, but subdivision (b) follows immediately and the context is so
close that the present arrangement is thought preferable because the
provisions constitute largely an independent subject." ANALYSiS OF H.R.
12889, supra note 48, at 228.
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owner by law solely by virtue of his ownership,74 a condition to
full enjoyment imposed by a contract valid against the trustee, 5
or a lien which the trustee cannot avoid."0 But the trustee's
acceptance of such property should not amount to assumption of
a contract of sale so as to elevate an unsecured obligation for
the purchase price to the level of a first priority administration
expense. Nor should his abandonment of the property, or even
his mistaken attempt to reject the contract of sale, have any
effect on a seller's unsecured claim for the price.77
Of course, to speak of a contract under which the nonbank-
rupt party has "fully performed" is to draw an extremely fine
line, one which would include among the executory contracts
which the trustee can accept or reject some which should be ex-
cluded. What of the nonbankrupt building contractor who has
fully performed save that he has failed to connect the water or
has made a defective connection? Such a failure, even if not
cured, would entitle the bankrupt to damages but would not be
sufficiently material to permit him to refuse to accept the build-
ing or to excuse his performance. 8 The trustee's rejection of
such a contract would neither add to nor detract from the estate's
benefits or its liabilities; his assumption of it, which likewise
would not benefit the estate, should therefore not convert the
contractor's claim into a first priority administration expense.
Hence, a contract so nearly performed by the nonbankrupt party
that failure to complete performance would not be sufficiently
material to excuse performance by the bankrupt should not be
74. Cf. Brown v. O'Kef% 300 U.S. 598 (1937), discussed in text
accompanying note 17 supra; American File Co. v. Garret, 110 U.S. 288
(1884), discussed note 11 supra.
75. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924), where the
bankruptcy trustee established his title under § 70a to an exchange seat
worth $10,500, but was told that he held it subject to an exchange
rule that forbade transfer until the bankrupt's $60,000 in debts to
other members of the exchange were paid. See also Hyde v. Woods,
94 U.S. 523 (1873), discussed in text accompanying note 12 supra.
76. Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961); York
Mg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906). The fact that the subsequent
enactment of what is now § 70c would today enable the bankruptcy
trustee to avoid the unfiled conditional sales contract involved in York
v. Cassell in no way alters the underlying principle, as the trustee in
Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank discovered when his attempt to in-
voke § 70c failed.
77. Cf. Gerber & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 110 Conn. 583, 148
A. 669 (1930), where it was assumed that a bankruptcy trustee of a buyer
of goods could adopt or reject the contract of sale which had been fully
performed by the seller.
78. 4 A. Comsx, ComnAcTs §§ 945-46 (1951); 6 A. Comn2, CON-
TRACTS §§ 1253-54; REsTATzENT op CoNTActs §§ 274-76 (1932).
1973]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
treated as an executory contract in bankruptcyY'
B. CONTRACTS PERFORMED BY THE BANKRUPT
Another example of a contract executory in the Willistonian
sense which should not be treated as an executory contract
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act is a contract which the
bankrupt has fully performed, but which the nonbankrupt party
has performed only partially or not at all.80 The bankrupt's claim
to further performance under such a contract obviously is an as-
set which in most instances will pass to the trustee under § 70a (5)
or (6).8' It is fairly obvious from the terms of the Act alone that
79. The Version of the "perfect tender" rule of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code for contracts for the sale of goods presents some compli-
cations. Under § 2-601, if "the goods or the tender of delivery fail in
any respect to conform to the contract," the buyer is given an option
to accept or reject the goods and, under § 2-711, may cancel the contract.
Rejection must be made within a reasonable time after tender (§ 2-
602) and, if not made within that time and after an opportunity to in-
spect the goods, constitutes an acceptance (§ 2-606). The buyer may
have a damage claim whether he accepts (§ 2-714) or rejects (§§ 2-711,
2-712, 2-713). If acceptance or rejection has occurred before the bank-
ruptcy of the buyer, that should conclude the matter. The buyer's bank-
ruptcy trustee should be confined to a claim for damages, subject to the
seller's right to cure the defective tender under UCC § 2-508. If nei-
ther has occurred before the buyer's bankruptcy, the reasonable time
allowed by the Code for election should include the time necessary to
select a trustee and to allow him to inform himtelf and make the elec-
tion. But if the nonconformity is not material, the contract should
not be treated as an executory contract within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act, i.e., the trustee's rejection of the goods should not be
treated as a rejection of such a contract and a breach of it under § 63c,
and the seller should still have the opportunity to cure the defective
tender under § 2-508. Similarly, the trustee's acceptance of the goods
should not be treated as an acceptance of the contract so as to convert
the obligation for the price into an administration expense.
The Code seems to recognize something approximating the doctrine
of material breach only as a basis for revocation of acceptance of goods(§ 2-608) or for rejection of nonconforming tenders under install-
ment contracts (§ 2-612).
80. This conclusion finds some slight support in In re H.K. Porter
Co., 24 F. Supp. 766, 767 (W.D. Pa. 1938), where a debtor in possession
under § 77B was held not entitled to reject an assignment of rents on its
mortgaged property, which it had earlier made in return for the mort-
gagee's abstaining from foreclosure after default, because "[sio far as
the debtor is concerned, it is an executed contract."
81. Section 70a(6) gives the trustee title to all the bankrupt's non-
exempt "rights of action arising upon contracts." The 1938 amendment
of § 70a(5) which gave the trustee title to all nonexempt "property,
including rights of action," (emphasis added) which the bankrupt can
transfer or his creditors can reach by legal process (see note 15 supra),
was apparently designed to reach noncontractual rights of action not
covered by § 70a(6). See 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY II 70.28[1] (14th
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such claims in favor of the bankrupt were not viewed as execu-
tory contracts. Obviously, the trustee's assumption of the un-
derlying contract would add nothing to his title to the claim. And
it would make no sense to say, as § 63c does of executory con-
tracts, that the trustee's rejection of a contract fully performed
by the bankrupt "shall constitute a breach of such contract."
Nor could the other contracting party, who has received full
performance from the debtor, have much of a claim under provi-
sions in the chapters providing that upon rejection of an execu-
tory contract any person injured by the rejection shall be deemed
a creditor.82
Since the bankrupt's claim against the other party is an asset
which will pass to the trustee, it is one which the trustee can ac-
cept or abandon just as he can accept or abandon noncontractual
claims. But his acceptance of the asset merely leaves the other
party's liability where § 70a of the Act has already transferred it,
while his abandonment of it merely leaves the other party liable
to the bankrupt as he was before bankruptcy.
Indeed, this is the manner in which the Act and the courts
have treated such contracts when questions have arisen as to the
treatment of actions on them which the bankrupt had pending
at bankruptcy. Section llc of the Act provides that the trustee
may, with approval of the court, prosecute any suit commenced
by the bankrupt prior to adjudication. This section has been
construed by the courts, which follow the statute in making no
distinction between suits based on contract and others, as mean-
ing that the trustee has three choices: (1) he may take over the
bankrupt's suit; (2) he may allow the bankrupt to continue it for
the benefit of the estate; or (3) he may abandon the claim to the
bankrupt. 83
ed. 1971). While the pertinent cases seem to treat "rights of action" in
both § 70a (5) and (6) as limited to matured causes of action, unmatured
claims also pass to the trustee as "property" under § 70a(5). Country-
man, supra note 46, at 471-72.
82. Bankruptcy Act §§ 202, 353, 458, 642.
83. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161 (1946) (noncontractual claim);
Sherman v. Buckley, 119 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 657 (1941) (nature of claim unspecified); Paradise v. Vogtlandische
Maschinen-Fabrik, 99 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1938) (noncontractual claim); In
re Prudence Co., 96 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1938) (contractual claim); American
Foods, Inc. v. DeZauche, 74 F. Supp. 681 (W.D.N.Y. 1947) (contractual
claim). In this the cases merely follow what had been decided under
§ llc before the Act contained any mention of executory contracts.
Johnson v. Collier, 222 U.S. 538 (1912) (noncontractual claim); Danciger
& Emerich Oil Co. v. Smith, 276 U.S. 542 (1928) (contractual claim).
Cf. Crook v. Prudential Ins. Co., 34 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Ky. 1940), hold-
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Here again, the concept of a nonexecutory contract should
accommodate the contract so nearly performed by the bankrupt
that his failure to complete performance would not constitute a
material breach which would excuse performance by the non-
bankrupt party. Rejection of such a contract by the trustee
should not be treated as a material breach excusing the other
party's performance. Nor should the trustee's assumption of such
a contract require either that performance of the bankrupt's ob-
ligation be completed at the expense of the estate or that the non-
bankrupt party's damage claim be elevated to a first priority ex-
pense of administration. 84
C. CONTRACTS UNPERFORMED ON BOTH SIDES
Thus, by a process similar to one method of sculpting an ele-
phant, 5 we approach a definition of executory contract within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act: a contract under which the
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the con-
tract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the per-
formance of the other.86
ing that, where a bankrupt did not schedule a claim under a disability
insurance policy and brought suit against the insurer after his bank-
ruptcy case was closed, the case should be reopened to allow the trustee
to intervene in the suit. See also Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513 (1896),
decided under the 1867 Act and discussed in text accompanying note
14 supra.
84. Again, the "perfect tender" rule of the Uniform Commercial
Code presents soluble complications where the seller has become bank-
rupt. See note 79 supra. If the buyer has either accepted or rejected
the goods before bankruptcy, that should conclude the matter, subject
to the seller's right to cure the defective tender under UCC § 2-508, and
leave the buyer with a provable claim in bankruptcy. If the buyer has
not made his election before the bankruptcy of the seller, he may do so
afterwards with similar results. The trustee may act to assume or re-ject the contract before the nonbankrupt buyer makes his election.
But if the nonconformity of the tender is not material, the contract
should not be treated as executory, the trustee's rejection should not
deprive the buyer of his election, and the trustee's assumption should
not elevate the buyer's damage claim to a first priority administration
expense.
85. Obtain a large piece of stone. Take hammer and chisel and
knock off everything that doesn't look like an elephant.
86. To avoid further complication of an already complex subject,
this article speaks generally of two-party contracts. But its analysis
will apply to multiparty contracts as well, so long as the "other party to
the contract" is limited to one from whom some performance is owing
to the bankrupt. Thus, if A and B in a single contract each undertakes
to sell a given quantity of goods to C and at C's bankruptcy A has per-
formed but B has not, and C has paid neither, the contract is not execu-
[Vol. 57:439
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Such a contract, similar to the contract under which the other
party has fully performed but the bankrupt has not, represents
a claim against the estate. But here that claim may be reduced
or totally eliminated if the trustee rejects the contract, because
the other party is required to mitigate damages by an amount
approximating the value of the performance he is spared by the
trustee's rejection. In addition, such a contract, like the one un-
der which the bankrupt has fully performed but the other party
has not, represents an asset of the estate to the extent that it car-
ries the unperformed obligation of the other party. But if the
trustee elects to assume the contract, as when he accepts other as-
sets to which he takes the title of the bankrupt under § 70a, he
takes it cum onere and must render that performance which the
bankrupt had contracted to perform as a condition to receiving
the benefits of the contract. Whether in a given case the trustee
will assume or reject depends, presumably, on his comparative
appraisal of the value of the remaining performance by the other
party and the cost to the estate of the unperformed obligation of
the bankrupt, although the Act is silent on that point.8 7
Consistent with this analysis, although often without any
extensive analysis of their own, the courts have treated a variety
of contracts as executory contracts under the Act where the ob-
ligations of both the bankrupt and the other contracting party
remained at least partially and materially unperformed at
bankruptcy. The cases include a contract by which the bankrupt
undertook to perform construction work against progress pay-
tory as to A, but is executory as to B. If C is joined in bankruptcy
by D, who had guaranteed payment of the purchase price, D's contract
is also not executory as to A, but is executory as to B.
87. Creedon & Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Les-
sees, 26 Bus. LAw. 1391, 1393-97 (1971), argue, in heavy reliance on the
equity receivership case of American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New
York Rys., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), that the trustee has no right to
reject a lease unless he demonstrates that the lease is "burdensome" in
the sense either that it cannot be performed by the trustee or that per-
formance by him would be unprofitable to the estate. But they overlook
the decision in Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. &
Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 549, 550 (1943), where the Court said of a similar
contention, "The argument ... that only burdensome leases may be
rejected is based on certain statements of ours that burdensome leases
may be rejected . . .and on cases like American Brake Shoe & Foun-
dry Co. v. New York Rys. Co ....... The Court went on in that case
to sustain the rejection of a lease in the § 77 reorganization plan of the
lessee, despite a showing that the lessee could operate profitably under
it, on the ground that "the question whether a lease should be rejected
... is one of business judgment." Cf. Shanker, The Treatment of Ex-
ecutory Contracts & Leases in Bankruptcy Chapter X & XI Proceedings,
18 PRnc. LAw., April, 1972, at 21-22.
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ments,8 8 a contract to grant a concession to sell refreshments in
the debtor's motion picture theatres in return for a percentage
of gross sales,8 9 a contract to sell the bankrupts' business under
the terms of which the buyer remained liable for a part of the
purchase price and the bankrupts remained obligated to pay cer-
tain accounts payable, to advise and consult with the buyers,
and not to enter a competing business,90 and a joint venture
agreement for construction of a shopping center under which the
bankrupt was to provide the money and the other party the serv-
ices.9 1 They even include a contract by which the debtor re-
tained an attorney to represent it in Chapter XI proceedings.
9 2
This is not to say that all of the cases are consistent with this
analysis or with each other. With respect to a number of types
of contracts recurring in bankruptcy contexts, there are some-
times irreconcilable results. Here again the results seem fre-
quently to be arrived at without any analysis. The inconsis-
tencies would have been avoided under the analysis proposed
above.
88. Stauduhar v. Limbach Co., 308 F. Supp. 696, 699 (E.D. Wis.
1970). But in this case the court seems to have overlooked the sig-
nificance of the bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid prebankruptcy
transfers as well as to reject executory contracts. The trustee of the
bankrupt contractor had rejected the contract and the bankrupt's surety
had settled with the other contracting party for completion of the work.
The dispute was over progress payments earned by the contractor's pre-
bankruptcy performance, which were claimed by both the surety under
the contractor's prebankruptcy assignment to it of all sums due under the
contract in the event of default and by an assignee from the trustee.
Although the surety had not filed a financing statement covering its
assignment, the court could not see how this fact would "create any lia-
bility" of the other contracting party to the trustee's assignee, even
though failure to file meant the assignment to the surety was unperfected
against levying creditors under § 9-301 (1) (b) of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and hence against the contractor's bankruptcy trustee under §
70c.
89. In re M & S Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 364
(D. Del. 1954).
90. Wagstaff v. Peters, 203 Kan. 108, 453 P. 120 (1969). Cf. In re
Michigan Express, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Mich. 1972), holding that,
where the bankrupt had purchased a business under a contract obli-
gating him to pay the seller for consulting services for the next five
years and went into banlrruptcy two years later, the contract was not
executory because no actual consulting services by the seller were con-
templated and the arrangement was merely a device to spread over a
five-year period a part of the purchase price for the business already
transferred.
91. Workman v. Harrison, 282 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1960).
92. In re Mona Shops, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), hold-
ing that the contract was properly subjected to review by the referee
because the attorney had failed to advise the debtor of his option to




a. Before Statutory Treatment of Executory Contracts
Prior to the 1930 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act dealing
with executory contracts, a number of cases arose concerning the
rights of parties to contracts for the sale of land. In these cases,
the full contract price had not been paid by the buyer, and title
had not been conveyed by the seller, at the time of bankruptcy
of either buyer or seller. The disposition of these cases lends
support to the proposed analysis.
One such case involved a vendee who was not in default at
his bankruptcy and a vendor who failed in his attempt to prove
that he was induced to enter the contract by fraud. The yen-
dee's trustee was allowed to assume the contract and sell the
land.93 In a later case, a vendee was in default before his bank-
ruptcy but the vendor waived the breach and tendered a war-
ranty deed after bankruptcy. The vendor was not permitted to
prove a claim for the full balance of the price because, at the
time of the bankruptcy of the vendee, the vendor had not yet
discharged a prior mortgage on the property and could not con-
vey good title. However, in this case the mortgage had been dis-
charged after the vendee's bankruptcy, and the vendor had a
possible claim for the vendee's use and occupancy of the land.
The court therefore suggested that the trustee of the vendee
should consider whether the interests of the estate would be
best served if he waived the vendor's default and assumed the
contract.
94
Similar reasoning applied where, prior to the vendor's bank-
ruptcy, the vendee had defaulted under a one-payment contract,
but the vendor had waived the breach and placed an executed
deed in escrow for delivery to the vendee on payment of the pur-
chase price. The vendee's trustee was held entitled to assume and
93. In re Miley, 187 F. 177 (N.D.W. Va. 1911).
94. Burns Mortgage Co. v. Bond Realty Corp., 47 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.
1931). But where prior to the vendee's bankruptcy the vendor had
initiated a repossession action in state court because of the vendee's de-
fault, obtained judgment and possession, and the 30-day redemption
period had expired before a trustee was elected, the trustee was held
not entitled to recover the land. In re Winter, 17 F.2d 153 (Eml. Mich.
1927). And where the vendor under a contract to convey land in re-
turn for services defaulted under a trust deed on the property and the
trustee under the deed sold the property after the vendee had fully per-
formed and before the vendor's bankruptcy, the vendee was held to have
a provable claim for damages for anticipatory breach. In re Beverly-
ridge Co., 35 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1929).
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enforce the contract on payment of the purchase price with inter-
est from the due date.0 5 But where the vendee was in default on
the first four installments under his contract at the time of his
bankruptcy, the vendor, who was not required "to treat nonpay-
ment of an installment ... as a total breach of the contract, even
if he might so treat it," was held to have a provable claim for
damages for breach of contract 6 Damages were measured by the
difference between the present value of all installments and the
value of the land at the closing date. In another case where the
vendee in possession had not defaulted prior to his bankruptcy
but a default in an installment payment occurred thereafter, the
vendor was allowed to exercise his contractual option to termi-
nate for default and to retake the land.9 7
However, where the vendee had contracted to buy, taken
possession of, and fully paid for the land under an oral contract,
all of which occurred prior to the vendor's bankruptcy, the ven-
dee was held entitled to a decree of specific performance against
the vendor's trustee. The trustee took no better title under §
70a than the vendor held at his bankruptcy. While it was recog-
nized that the vendee's rights under her oral contract might be
subject to those of levying creditors, the trustee of the vendor,
under the 1910 version of the § 47a (2) 98 "strong arm" clause, had
that status only with respect to property coming into the posses-
sion of the bankruptcy court; as to the property in the posses-
sion of the vendee, he stood in the position of a judgment creditor
with an execution returned unsatisfied. 99
Perhaps the most complicated of the early cases involved a
vendor who had gone into equity receivership and a vendee na-
95. Mound Mines Co. v. Hawthorne, 173 F. 882 (8th Cir. 1909).
96. In re Marshall's Garage, 63 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1933). Cf.
Kenyon v. Mulert, 184 F. 825 (3rd Cir. 1911), where the vendee had de-
faulted under his installment contract and the vendor had obtained a
decree of specific performance before the vendee's bankruptcy but later
agreed with the bankruptcy trustee, with the approval of the court, to
rescind the contract. The vendor was held to have no provable claim
for the balance of the purchase price.
97. In re Dermer, 56 F.2d 223 (S.D. Cal. 1931).
98. 36 Stat. 838 (1910).
99. Clark v. Snelling, 205 F. 240 (1st Cir. 1913). Cf. Dunlop v.
Baker, 239 F. 193 (4th Cir. 1916), where an individual holding a binding
option to purchase real estate in the vendor's possession at the time of
the latter's bankruptcy was held entitled to a decree of specific perform-
ance. The decree was based on the vendee's offer to pay the option
price and as much more as was necessary to pay all debts repre-




tional bank that also went into liquidating receivership under
the National Bank Act. The vendor's receiver assumed the con-
tract but was held not entitled to a decree of specific performance
against the receiver of the bank-vendee because the latter had
the right to reject the contract and because specific performance
would prefer the vendor's estate over other creditors of the ven-
dee. Hence, the vendor's receiver was entitled only to a claim for
damages. 100
b. Under the Statutory Concept of Executory Contracts
The cases decided since the 1930 amendments all involve con-
tracts for the purchase of land under which the full price had not
been paid and title had not been conveyed. They focus more
precisely on the statutory concept of an executory contract than
the earlier cases and, for the most part, support the pro-
posed analysis. In In re New York Investors Mutual Group,
Inc.,101 the vendee paid $15,000 and was to pay a $90,000 balance
on closing, but the vendor went into bankruptcy before the clos-
ing date. The vendor's trustee was held to have rejected the
contract by failing to act within the time specified in § 70b and
thus to have defeated the vendee's right to specific perform-
ance.10 2 Even though under applicable state law the doctrine of
"equitable conversion" gave the vendee "equitable title," that ti-
tle was subject to the trustee's power to reject the contract under
§ 70b. 103 The contract of sale had been recorded before bank-
100. National Bank v. Louisville Trust Co., 67 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1933),
cert. denied, 291 U.S. 665 (1934). The court based its preference ar-
gument on Express Co. v. Railroad Co., 99 U.S. 191 (1878), discussed note
11 supra. Of course, a preference to the vendor would result if the re-
ceiver of the vendee elected to assume the contract since payment of
the purchase price would then become an expense of administration.
Presumably, however, the vendee's receiver should only assume the
contract where he concludes that, despite the preference, other creditors
would benefit because he could dispose of the land for more than he
would have to pay. Where both parties are in receivership or bank-
ruptcy, therefore, it is not surprising that one receiver or trustee would
reject what the other would assume.
101. 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
102. Although the closing date had passed without the discharge
of a mortgage which would have prevented the vendor from conveying
the title required by the contract, the time within which the ven-
dor's trustee would have been deemed to have rejected the mortgage
under § 70b had apparently expired before the closing date. Cf. Burns
Mortgage Co. v. Bond Realty Corp., 47 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1931), discussed
in text accompanying note 94 supra.
103. National Bank v. Louisville Trust Co., 67 F.2d 97 (6th Cir.
1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 665 (1934), discussed in text accompanying
note 100 supra, reasoned in the opposite direction: since the power to
1973]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ruptcy, a precaution necessary only to protect the vendee against
subsequent good faith purchasers and mortgagees taking
through the vendor. 10 4 The contract provided that the vendee
should have a lien on the premises for the $15,000 it had paid.
The effect of that provision on the trustee's ability to reject the
contract without returning the amount paid was not decided be-
cause the new purchaser to whom the trustee had sold the prop-
erty had agreed to pay that amount to the vendee.
In In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co.,10 5 an assignee for
the benefit of creditors sold the debtor's realty at auction for
$25,000 and accepted a 15% deposit, the balance to be payable on
closing. But within four months of the assignment, and before
the assignee and the vendor agreed on a closing date, an involun-
tary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the debtor on the
ground that the assignment constituted an act of bankruptcy.
After adjudication, the bankruptcy trustee having received a
better bid for the property, it was held proper for him to reject
the original contract and to solicit further bids. As a conse-
quence, the original vendee from the assignee had to bid $31,000
to retain the property. The contract was found to be executory
under applicable state law.100 However, on the authority of
New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., the state doctrine of
"equitable conversion" was held to be subject to the trustee's
power to reject under § 70b. In response to the vendee's conten-
tion that the realty [and hence the assignee's contract to sell it?]
was not property of the bankrupt, the court replied that § 70a (8)
gives the trustee the "title of the bankrupt" to property held by
an assignee for the benefit of creditors under an assignment
which constituted an act of bankruptcy, and also provides that
such property shall be deemed held by the assignee as agent of
the bankrupt. 10 7 Nothing was said about crediting the vendee's
reject precludes specific performance there is no "equitable conversion,"
that phenomenon being merely an incident of the right to specific per-
formance. See also 3 AMicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.22 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952).
104. N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 290, 291 (1968).
105. 278 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1960).
106. As indicated in note 71 supra, the state courts' characterization
of the contract seems irrelevant.
107. Although the court quoted the language reproduced in the
text, it followed the time-honored custom of ignoring the question, what
is the "title of the bankrupt" to property he has transferred to an as-
signee for the benefit of creditors. It also ignored the fact that § 2a(21)
authorized it to require the assignee to "deliver" the land, the assignee's
contract, and the 15% deposit (if still in the assignee's possession or
under his control) to the bankruptcy trustee.
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original 15% deposit on the payment due under his new contract
with the bankruptcy trustee.
Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazol0 reached a similar conclu-
sion with respect to a vendee who had paid the vendor two-thirds
of the purchase price for land before the latter became a bank-
rupt. The failure of the vendor's trustee to act within the time
specified in § 70b was held to constitute a rejection of the con-
tract so that the trustee was free to sell the land to another.
But here the contract of sale provided that the amounts paid by
the vendee to the vendor should be held in escrow until the clos-
ing date and should be returned to the vendee if closing did not
take place for any reason other than the vendee's default. The
escrow provisions of the contract were viewed as a separate con-
tract which the trustee could not reject since the vendee had
fully performed. Hence, the vendor, and subsequently his bank-
ruptcy trustee, held the money in trust. The vendee was there-
fore entitled to a recovery to the extent he could trace the funds.
To the extent the money could not be traced, the vendee would
have a general claim for it against the bankrupt estate in addition
to his general claim for damages resulting from the trustee's
rejection. 0 9
Both the land contract and its escrow provisions were
treated as executory in In re Swindle."0 In that case, the vendor,
prior to his bankruptcy, had received a down payment from
the vendee and had placed a deed in escrow. The deed was to be
delivered to the vendee on payment to the escrow agent of the
108. 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963).
109. See also In re Ross Dev. Co., 98 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1951),
holding that vendees who had made down payments under land con-
tracts with a vendor who was to construct homes on the property
prior to his conveyances had provable claims for damages. In Ross, the
vendor was in default on some contracts prior to his bankruptcy and
the bankruptcy trustee had rejected the others. In In re Robertson,
41 F. Supp. 665 (W.). Ark. 1941), a vendor, under a land contract calling
for payment of the entire purchase price at closing, went into bank-
ruptcy before closing. The trustee rejected the contract by failing to
act within the time specified in § 70b. As a result, the vendee lost his
damage claim for failure to file a proof of claim within the six-month
period fixed by § 57n and the trustee resold the property. Cf. In re
Charles Nelson Co., 27 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1939), holding that where
the vendor deposited a deed in escrow and the vendee, after making
some installment payments, filed for reorganization under § 77B, in-
stallment payments falling due before the trustee had elected to assume
or reject the contract would not be ordered paid as first priority admin-
istration expenses where the estate had received no benefit from the
property.
110. 188 F. Supp. 601 (D. Ore. 1960).
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
balance of the purchase price, from which sum the escrow agent
was to pay off a prior unrecorded mortgage and to remit the bal-
ance to the vendor. After the vendor's bankruptcy, the vendee
paid the balance of the price to the escrow agent. When the
vendor's trustee then elected to assume the contract he was per-
mitted to do so, but the mortgagee was held entitled to payment
from the escrow funds-the trustee took the contract cum onere.
Nothing was said about the possible invalidity of the unrecorded
mortgage against the trustee of the vendor-mortgagor who, pur-
suant to the strong-arm clause in § 70c, had the status of a hypo-
thetical levying creditor as of the date of bankruptcy. Perhaps
this was because the applicable recording statute protected only
a subsequent bona fide purchaser who recorded first,'1 1 although
the state court had held out hope to both attaching creditors and
bankruptcy trustees of the mortgagor that they might somehow
qualify as such bona fide purchasers. 112 Or perhaps the escrow
provisions of the contract were viewed as imposing a trust on the
escrow funds for the benefit of the mortgagee which was valid as
against the trustee of the mortgagor without regard to the valid-
ity of the mortgage.
A final decision, In re Mesa Steel Corp.," 3 is presented in an
opinion which is as obscure in its statement of the facts as in its
reasoning. Vendor, with record title to land subject to an unre-
corded $40,000 mortgage, contracted to sell the property to Ven-
dee #1 in return for shares of stock in Vendee # 1 and the as-
sumption by Vendee #p1 of "all liens" on the property. Vendee
#1 then contracted to sell the land to Vendee #2 for $60,000,
payments to be made to an escrow agent. Vendee #1 thereafter
unilaterally directed the escrow agent to pay the mortgage from
escrow payments. After Vendee #2 had paid $42,000 into escrow,
but before any payments were made on the mortgage, both Ven-
dor and Vendee #1 went into bankruptcy (whether in the same
or different courts does not appear). The trustee of Vendee #1
then obtained from the trustee of Vendor a deed which purported
to convey the property free of the mortgage.'" The trustee of
111. ORE. REV. STAT. § 93.640 (1971).
112. Bailey v. Hickey, 99 Ore. 251, 195 P. 372 (1921); Coates v.
Smith, 81 Ore. 556, 160 Pac. 517 (1916).
113. 229 F. Supp. 669, 672, 673 (D. Ariz. 1964).
114. A possible justification for this procedure may be founded on
the theory that the unrecorded mortgage, being void as to "creditors and
subsequent purchasers" under Aaxz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (1956), was
invalid as to vendor's trustee under § 70c. Whether the trustee had ever
obtained a ruling to that effect does not appear.
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Vendee #1 also elected to assume the contract with Vendee #2.
The court handling the bankruptcy of Vendee #1 held that
the mortgagee was entitled to be paid from the escrow payments
made by Vendee #2. The path to this conclusion, as nearly as
it can be traced, runs as follows: Both contracts were execu-
tory, and the trustee of Vendee #1 had assumed them both.
(Apparently he assumed the first by obtaining, and the trustee
of Vendor assumed it by giving, a deed to the property.) Under
applicable state law Vendor held his record title as security for
the covenant of Vendee #1 to "assume and pay" the mortgage.
This security interest of Vendor in the record legal title was
good against the trustee of Vendee #1 despite his status as an
hypothetical levying creditor under § 70c. (The effect of the
deed executed by the trustee of Vendor was not discussed.) The
mortgagee was subrogated (?) to Vendor's security interest.
Therefore (sic), the trustee of Vendee #1, having assumed both
contracts, must perform the covenants of Vendee #1 under
both" 5 and "stands as a conduit" for payment of the mortgagee
from escrow funds." 6
Save for the Mesa Steel Corp. case, which defies understand-
ing on many points, the cases decided under the Bankruptcy
Act's provisions relating to executory contracts more or less ex-
plicitly employ the analysis proposed above. Certainly a con-
tract under which the vendee still owes a material part of the
purchase price and the vendor has not transferred title, and is
not obligated to do so until that price is fully paid, is an execu-
tory contract. The fact that the vendee's payments go to an
escrow agent rather than to the vendor, whether or not the agent
is to apply them for the vendor's benefit prior to closing, does
not seem to call for a different conclusion. The escrow agree-
ment should not be treated as a "separate contract," whether or
not it is embodied in a separate document, in any case where ob-
115. Perhaps the theory is that the escrow agreement imposed a
trust on the escrow funds for the benefit of the mortgagee which was
valid against the trustee of Vendee #1 regardless of the validity or in-
validity of the mortgage.
116. Without any 'explanation, the court also concluded that the
mortgagee's claim on the escrow funds was prior to a federal tax lien
on those funds. It does not appear when the tax lien arose or whether
or not it was filed. Both of the.land contracts were made and both
Vendor and Vendee #1 went into bankruptcy in 1961. Under INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 6323 as it then was (68A Stat. 79 (1954) ) the tax lien
was subordinate to a mortgage prior in time and, until filed, to a subse-




ligations of the parties under that agreement and the balance of
the bargain are mutually dependent.' 17 The fact that the vendor
as a part of the bargain has executed and placed with the escrow
agent the formal documents necessary to effect a transfer of title
likewise should not alter the result where the vendee is not enti-
tled to have the transfer effected until payments are completed.
Hence, on bankruptcy of the vendee while the contract remains
in this mutually executory condition, the vendee's trustee can
assume the contract, complete the payments as an expense of ad-
ministration, and compel specific performance by the vendor.
Alternatively, he can reject the contract and give the vendor a
provable claim for damages. Whether the rejecting trustee also
has a claim for return of payments made to the vendor or an
escrow agent, or a security interest in the land for payments
made, should depend on the terms of the contract and, if they
provide for forfeiture of such payments, on their validity under
applicable nonbankruptcy law. 18
Similarly, where the contract stands in this mutually execu-
tory condition on the bankruptcy of the vendor, his trustee can
assume the contract, tender a transfer of title, and recover the
unpaid balance of the purchase price. Or he can reject the con-
tract and leave the vendee to prove a claim for damages.
117. 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 696 (1960). Thus, the fact that the
vendee has made all escrow payments required, as in Gulf Petroleum,
S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963), discussed in text at note 108
supra, or that the vendor has placed all required documents in escrow,
should not render the escrow agreement nonexecutory as long as other
material requirements of the bargain between vendor and vendee are
unperformed by each. This is not to say, however, that the escrow
provisions of an executory contract may not have given an enforceable
interest in identifiable escrow payments to the vendee, as in Gulf
Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, to a third party, as in In re Swindle, 188 F.
Supp. 601 (D. Ore. 1960), discussed in text at note 110 supra, or to the
vendor.
118. But the question of entitlement to payments made by the ven-
dee who ends in bankruptcy may arise even though the contract is not
executory. Even where the contract is otherwise fully performed on
both sides before the bankruptcy of the vendee, the vendor has no
preferred claim to the balance of a part of the purchase price retained
but not entirely needed by the vendee to discharge liens on the prop-
erty where the vendor makes no showing that the retainage was held
in trust or that the unused balance could be identified in the vendee's
bankrupt estate. American Service Co. v. Henderson, 120 F.2d 525 (4th
Cir. 1941). Cf. Lathrop v. Specht, 186 Iowa 225, 172 N.W. 296 (1919),
holding that when an assignee for the benefit of creditors rejects an
executory contract to sell land he must return a down payment made
by the vendee even though there was no showing that the amount paid
was ever received by the assignee.
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Whether the vendee has an enforceable interest in identifiable
escrow payments,1 1 9 or a security interest in the land for pay-
ments made,'1 20 would again depend on the terms of the agree-
ment and their effectiveness under applicable nonbankruptcy
law. But any such interest of the vendee in real estate not per-
fected against bona fide purchasers would be in jeopardy under
§ 60 and any interest in either the land or escrow payments not
perfected against levying creditors could be defeated by the ven-
dor's trustee under § 70c.121
Thus, under this analysis, the vendee, on rejection by the
bankruptcy trustee of the vendor, will lose the land. Unless he
is well counseled and protected by draftsmanship in advance, he
may also be left with only a provable general claim for dam-
ages. 22 On the theory that this treatment of the vendee under
an installment land contract is unfair as compared to the treat-
ment of one who buys land under a purchase money mortgage,
it has recently been argued that the courts should find for the
vendee an "equitable lien" on the land for the amount he has
paid or alternatively that § 70b should be amended to prohibit
the trustee of the vendor from rejecting an executory contract
for the sale of land under which the vendee is not in default.12 3
Whatever the future of these proposals may be,'2 4 the assump-
119. See notes 117-18 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
121. I would also argue that if the vendee's interest was unper-
fected against a contractual or statutory lienor with a provable claim in
the vendor's bankruptcy case, the trustee could defeat the interest under
§ 70e; but others would disagree. See Countryman, The Use of State
Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part II), 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631, 657-661 (1972).
122. In another manifestation of the belief that the truth, if it will
not make us free, will at least give us some protection against our own
gullibility and the designs of others upon us, Congress in 1968 enacted
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 82 Stat. 590, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1701 et seq. (1970). Regulations issued under that Act require de-
velopers using the mails or interstate commerce for the sale of sub-
division lots to file with the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment and supply to the purchaser in advance of sale information
which makes it "ummistakably clear" if "the buyer... is exposed to the
risk of losing his investment in the event of the developer's failure or
bankruptcy." 24 C.F.R. § 1710.110 (1972).
123. Levy, Bankruptcy and The Land Sale Contract, 23 CAsE W. Rss.
L. REV. 393, 403-05, 409 (1972).
124. Recognition of an "equitable Hen" would give the vendee a se-
cured claim for the return of the amounts he had paid rather than an
unsecured claim for damages. As recognized in part by Levy, id. at
405, and in full by Shanker, supra note 87, at 27-28, some amendment
of § 60a(2) and (6) would apparently be necessary to accommodate the
equitable lien. Forbidding the trustee to reject the contract would
give the vendee the benefit of his bargain and would, in some cases, put
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tion that the purchase money mortgagor of realty is in a better
position seems correct. In the great bulk of such cases, where
the credit is extended by a bank or other third-party lender who
takes a mortgage from the vendee, the mortgagee-lender has
performed its obligation when it makes payment to the vendor
or otherwise advances the purchase money. Even in "title the-
ory" jurisdictions, no formal conveyance of title from mortgagee
to mortgagor is required if the mortgagor repays the debt at ma-
turity.125 Hence the mortgage should not be viewed as an exec-
utory contract which the bankruptcy trustee of either the mort-
gagee or the mortgagor can reject.
In the rarer type of case, where the vendor of land is him-
self the purchase money mortgagee, including those cases where
applicable nonbankruptcy law will treat the land sale contract
as a mortgage, 1 26 the situation seems no different. The vendor-
mortgagee in either a title or lien theory state has fully per-
formed when he has executed the deed and surrendered posses-
sion of the property. Ergo, his mortgage also should not be
treated as an executory contract.
This analysis of the purchase money mortgage of realty,
which is equally applicable to the nonpurchase money mortgage
after the mortgagee has advanced all he is obligated to advance,
has apparently appeared self-evident to the parties involved.
There seems to be no recorded instance of attempted assump-
tion or rejection by a receiver for or a trustee of either mortgagor
or mortgagee.
the trustee of the vendor in the construction business. See In re
Ross Dev. Co., 98 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1951), discussed in note 109
supra. Aside from an assumption that vendees under land contracts are
always consumers while all other creditors, including others whose
executory contracts are rejected by the vendor's trustee, are "commercial
creditors" who are better able to protect themselves, Levy, supra note
123, at 410-11, there is no attempt to justify the more favorable treatment
of land contract vendees over other parties to executory contracts under
either proposal. Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 467, 478 (1964), argues
that because real property is unique the court should, in "cases of un-
usual hardship on the vendee, as where no comparable real estate is
obtainable, . . . deny rejection on condition that the vendee agree to a
higher purchase price." This seems but another way of saying that the
trustee of the vendor can reject the contract and make a new one with
the vendee at a higher price as was done in In re Philadelphia Penn
Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1960), discussed in text accompanying
note 105 supra.
125. 4 AxviucANx LAw op PRopEnTY § 16.160 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
126. See Levy, supra note 123, at 405-07.
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The resulting unfairness in the treatment of vendees under
land contracts as compared with purchase money mortgagors is
not, however, the inexorable product of a distinction between ex-
ecutory and nonexecutory contracts under the Bankruptcy Act.
It is, rather, the result of unfair treatment imposed by state law.
The trustee of a purchase money mortgagee being unable to re-
ject the contract, the mortgagor is undisturbed by the mortga-
gee's bankruptcy although he may thereafter make his payments
to someone else who buys the mortgage from the mortgagee's
bankruptcy trustee. And in the event of the mortgagor's bank-
ruptcy, his trustee is left with the mortgagor's right under state
law to save his equity either by redeeming the property from the
mortgage, 2 7 selling the property subject to the mortgage, 28 or
claiming the equity from the proceeds of a liquidation of the
property in the bankruptcy proceeding or at foreclosure sale.12-
Or, if the mortgagor's equity has no value, his trustee may
abandon the property.30
On the other hand, when the vendor under a land contract
becomes a bankrupt, rejection of the contract by his trustee may
leave the vendee with only a provable general claim. And if the
vendee becomes a bankrupt and his trustee finds it is not feasible
to assume the contract and perforce rejects it, he will have no
better rights than the vendee after default and may find that
state law forfeits the payments already made. But this is only
because the bankruptcy law now confines the vendee on the
vendor's bankruptcy and the vendee's trustee on the vendee's
bankruptcy to the vendee's rights under state law. It need not
do so. It could be written to invalidate state-tolerated forfeiture
provisions in private contracts. 13 1
127. General Order 28, 28 U.S.C.; In re East Stroudsburg Supply &
Constr. Co., 248 F. 356 (IvLD. Pa. 1918).
128. In re Humeston, 83 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1936); In re Haywood
Wagon Co., 219 F. 655 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 625 (1915).
129. Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931); Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Tim-
ber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931). See also Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284
U.S. 225 (1931).
130. Federal Land Bank v. Nalder, 116 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 578 (1941); Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 76
F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 753 (1933); Bushong v.
Theard, 37 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1930); In re Harralson, 179 F. 490 (8th
Cir. 1910); In re Polumbo, 271 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Va. 1967); In re Yal-
den, 109 F. Supp. 603 (D. Mass. 1953); In re Malcom, 48 F. Supp. 675 (ED.
Ill. 1943); In re Watts, 19 F.2d 526 (E.D. La. 1927).
131. Or, as I have suggested in another context, the equitable pow-
ers of the bankruptcy court could be invoked to invalidate unconscion-
able contract provisions. Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bank-
ruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 407, 428-30 (1972).
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2. Sales of Goods
In the land contract cases, the contracts are viewed as exec-
utory if the vendee has not paid the full price and the vendor
has not conveyed the title, whether or not the vendor has sur-
rendered possession to the vendee. The formalities essential to
the transfer of title are a substantial part of the vendor's per-
formance under the contract, as is his obligation to preserve, or
at least to acquire by the closing date, record title of the sort re-
quired by the contract to be conveyed. 132
But where the contract is for the sale of goods the emphasis
shifts. Although we have an elaborate system for recording en-
cumbrances on goods, we have no comparable system for record-
ing title to them.133 Nor are any formalities essential to the pas-
sage of title (or of "property," as it was under the Uniform Sales
Act). That impalpable event occurs when the parties intend
that it shall occur. This was the rule of the common law' 34 and
of the Uniform Sales Act135 and is now the rule of § 2-401 (2) of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Physical delivery of the goods
rather than transfer of title is the important aspect of the seller's
performance. The latter may precede or follow the former, but
presumably that is a matter to which the parties have already
committed themselves, so that delivery is normally the seller's
last act of performance. Indeed, as § 2-401(2) of the Code now
puts it, "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the
buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his per-
formance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods,"
and any reservation of title by the seller thereafter "is limited in
effect to a reservation of a security interest."3' Hence title must
pass at or before delivery of the goods. An attempt to delay its
132. This is not to suggest that delivery of possession is not an im-
portant part of the vendor's obligation, but only that the transfer of
title is of such importance that a vendor who has surrendered pos-
session but has not transferred title has not performed all material
parts of his obligation. The same would be true of a vendor who had
transferred title but had not surrendered possession.
133. An exception is to be found in the Certificate of Title Acts of
some states applicable to motor vehicles. See 1 GILMORE, SECURITY IN-
TERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 20.1-20.4 (1965). Although the case has
not yet arisen, the importance of the certificate under some of these
statutes may justify bankruptcy treatment of contracts for the sale of
vehicles similar to the treatment of contracts for the sale of land.
134. 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 261 (1948).
135. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 18.
136. The Code draftsmen were so enamored of the last proposition
that they stated it twice, once in § 1-201 (37) and again in § 2-401 (1).
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passage beyond that time is ineffective for the purpose intended
although it will reserve to the seller a security interest.
The Code goes even further in § 2-401: "Each provision of
this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies
of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers
to such title." Save for a few such references, of no significance
here,"3 7 § 2-401 provides its rules for determining the passage of
title only because some other non-Code "public regulation" de-
pends upon location of title.13s Nothing in the Code's disdain for
the title concept suggests that bankruptcy courts should now give
it more significance than they have in cases involving pre-Code
sales of goods.
a. Before the Uniform Commercial Code
What those cases reveal is the treatment of contracts for the
sale of goods as executory if some part of the goods remains
undelivered and some part of the purchase price remains unpaid,
without inquiry into the location of title. In only one case, where
neither money nor goods had moved, was the matter of title even
adverted to. "Assuming that the property had passed to the
buyer,... the obligation to deliver the articles to the buyer con-
tinued" and the "contract was executory."1 3
Hence, where neither payment nor delivery has been com-
pleted, the trustee of the seller may reject the contract and leave
the buyer with a provable claim for breach 40 which the buyer
may set off against his liability for the price of goods already de-
livered and accepted before bankruptcy.1 4 1 Alternatively, the
trustee of the seller may assume and perform the contract and
hold the buyer for the price, 1 42 in which event the buyer is enti-
tled to a credit for any part of the purchase price already paid '43
or for defective goods returned to the seller before bank-
ruptcy.144
137. They are collected in R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 125 (1970).
138. U ornom Cozn SRc.IAL CODE § 2-401, Comment 1.
139. Columbia Products Corp. v. Coronation Diamonds, Inc., 276
App. Div. 1083, 1084, 95 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (1950).
140. United States v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1953).
141. United States v. Brunner, 282 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1960).
142. In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994 (3rd Cir. 1951); In re
De Long Furniture Co., 188 F. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1911).
143. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Hurley, 153 F. 503 (8th
Cir. 1907), affd on other grounds, 213 U.S. 126 (1909); Grief Bros. Coop-
erage Co. v. Mullinix, 264 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1920).




There are also a few cases recognizing that the trustee or the
receiver of a buyer under such a contract has the option to as-
sume or reject, although in each case the trustee's decision was to
reject and leave the seller with a provable claim for breach.14 An
early case, where the seller without knowledge of the buyer's re-
ceivership had delivered the goods, held that the receivers must
either assume the contract and pay the price as a cost of adminis-
tration or reject the contract and return the goods, since, in the
event of rejection, they were entitled to possession only of goods
"owned" by the debtor at the time of their appointment. 4 " If
Judge Learned Hand had the same case today in a bankruptcy
context and with the benefit of the Uniform Commercial Code he
might say that a rejecting trustee of the buyer would have no
better right to the goods than would the buyer himself if he had
repudiated the contract as of the date of bankruptcy. 147
Nonetheless, while the concept of title has not been signifi-
cant in determining whether contracts for the sale of goods re-
main executory, it persists as a source of confusion about the
remedies available to one contracting party when the bank-
ruptcy trustee of the other rejects contracts which involve more
than simply the sale of goods. Early cases, involving contracts
under which the bankrupt had undertaken to pay for the erection
of a building on his premises and had gone into bankruptcy after
the builder had delivered the construction materials but before he
had erected the building or received payment, granted the build-
er's petition to reclaim the materials on a finding that he still
had title to them. No mention was made of the trustee's option
to assume or reject the contract. 1 48
In re Universal Medical Services, Inc., 40 continues that ap-
145. Continental Motors Corp. v. Morris, 169 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1948) (trustee); Samuels v. E.F. Drew & Co., 292 F. 734 (2d Cir. 1923)
(receiver); Menke v. Willcox, 275 F. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (receiver).
146. Eames v. H.B. Claflin Co., 220 F. 190, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
See also Pacific Western Oil Co. v. McDuffie, 69 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 568 (1934), holding that prior to the receiv-
er's election to assume or reject a contract to purchase oil the seller
does not have a first priority claim for oil delivered before the receiver-
ship.
147. Under U.C.C. § 2-703, when the buyer repudiates the contract
the seller may withhold the goods and claim for damages.
148. In re Thornton Co., 11 F.2d 669 (M.D. Pa. 1926); In re John H.
Parker Co., 268 F. 868 (N.D. Ohio 1920); In re P.J. Sullivan Co.,
247 F. 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1918).
149. 460 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1972). Some of the facts are taken from
the opinion below. In re Universal Medical Services, Inc., 325 F. Supp.
890 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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proach. There, the debtor had contracted to have a raised steel
floor installed in its premises for a fixed price apparently pay-
able on completion. At the time of the debtor's Chapter XI peti-
tion and the appointment of a receiver, the installer had deliv-
ered all of the flooring and had placed 75 per cent of it into a
grid system attached to the existing floor but had not yet at-
tached the flooring tiles to the grids. Before the Chapter XI pro-
ceeding had failed and the debtor had been adjudicated a bank-
rupt, the installer sought to reclaim the flooring. After the ad-
judication and the appointment of a trustee, it being conceded
that the trustee had rejected the contract, the court held that
the installer could reclaim the flooring because he had retained
title. Under applicable Pennsylvania case law, unless otherwise
provided by the contract, title to materials furnished by a
builder did not pass to the owner of the premises until "affixed"
to the realty. The flooring unattached was not "affixed."
b. Under the Uniform Commercial Code
No mention was made in Universal Medical Services of the
Uniform Commercial Code although it was in effect in Pennsyl-
vania long before the contract was made. If applicable, § 2-401
(2) would mandate that title passed when the installer completed
"his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods," since it was not "otherwise explicitly agreed" that title
would pass at a different time. Indeed, under Sections 1-201 (37)
and 2-401 (1), any attempt by the installer to postpone the passage
of title beyond that time would have been effective only to re-
serve a security interest. But perhaps Article 2 of the Code does
not apply to construction and installation contracts. Section 2-102
provides that Article 2 applies "to transactions in goods" unless
the context otherwise requires, specifically excluding "any trans-
action which although in the form of an unconditional contract to
sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a security trans-
action."' 0° But nothing in Article 2 suggests that its draftsmen
had in mind a construction or installation contract or a sale of
goods which are to become fixtures when the seller completes his
performance, although § 2-107 does provide for sales of goods to
be severed from the realty.151 Save for the definition of the
150. The Comment to § 2-102 advises only that Article 2 "regulates
the general sales aspects" of purchase money security transactions.
151. Nonasmom, supra note 137, at § 21, follows in the tradition of
1 WumSToN, supra note 134, at § 9b, in carefully distinguishing sales
from gifts, bailments and leases but ignoring construction and installa-
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scope of Article 2 in § 2-102, its provisions do not speak of "trans-
actions in goods" but rather of "contracts for sale," "sales,"' 152
"buyers"'153 and "sellers."' 5 4 It may be, therefore, that construc-
tion and installation contracts are to be governed by non-Code
law.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that all installation
contracts will be excluded from the Code's coverage or that any
distinction between construction and installation contracts will
prove to be viable. (Why distinguish, for example, between the
floor installer in Universal Medical Services and the builder who
is to install floors as a part of the construction of a building?)
What, for instance, of the seller who is obligated by his contract
not only to give the buyer possession of a machine but also to
make such adjustments after delivery as are necessary to put it
in good operating order? Obviously what is to be "delivered" is
an operational machine, not an imperfectly assembled assort-
ment of its component parts. Certainly it does not stretch the
tion contracts. Cases involving other contracts, performance of which
is not likely to be interrupted by the bankruptcy of either party, which
find the implied warranty provisions of Article 2 inapplicable because
"service predominates," are not particularly helpful here. Epstein v.
Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963) (beauty treat-
ment); Lovett v. Emory University, 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923
(1967) (blood transfusion). Cf. Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585,
258 A.2d 697 (1969) (beauty treatment); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hos-
pital, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969) (blood transfusion). See also Wm.
H. Wise & Co., Inc. v. Rand McNally Co., 195 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), holding that a contract between a book publisher and a printer
for the printing of a book by the latter, with the publisher supplying the
manuscript and art work and the paper stock on which the book was
to be printed, was a contract of service rather than sale so that the
printer, although he might have a common law or statutory artisan's
lien, did not have a statutory vendor's lien. North American Leisure
Corp. v. A. & B. Duplicators, Ltd., 468 F.2d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 1972),
reaches the same conclusion concerning a contract under which a debtor
in Chapter XI proceedings had supplied a master sound tape to a aupli-
cating company which was to duplicate the master on tapes, cartridges,
and cassettes supplied by the duplicating company. The "single factor
of who supplies the majority of the materials" was held not to be dis-
positive, the contract was held to be one of service rather than sale, and
the duplicating company was held not entitled to a vendor's lien under
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-703 and 2-706, although perhaps entitled
to a statutory artisan's lien.
152. "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price" (§ 2-106(1) ) which may be "payable in money
or otherwise" (§ 2-304(1)).
153. "'Buyer' means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods"
(§ 2-103(1) (a) ).
154. "'Seller' means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods"
(§ 2-103 (1) (d) ).
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language of § 2-401(2) very far to say that the seller has not com-
pleted his performance "with reference to the physical delivery of
the goods" until the machine is operational, and hence that title
will not pass earlier unless otherwise explicitly agreed. Moreover,
the provisions of Sections 1-201 (37) and 2-401(1), limiting
the effect of a reservation of title after delivery to a reservation
of a security interest, could also be read to encompass such an
expanded concept of "delivery."'155
But to what end? Should the reading of § 2-401(2)-or of
explicit provisions in the contract' 5 -- to retain title in the seller
mean that he is entitled to reclaim the goods from a rejecting
trustee of a bankruptcy buyer? Since under § 70a the trustee of
the buyer takes only such rights against the seller as the buyer
155. Although nothing helpful was decided, this situation was pre-
sented in Texas W. Financial Corp. v. McCraw Candies, Inc., 347 F.
Supp. 445 (N-D. Tex. 1972). There, the seller went into bankruptcy
after delivering a candy-wrapping machine and after nine months of
adjustments had rendered it only 90% operational. The seller had dis-
counted the buyer's $7,000 note and chattel mortgage to a finance com-
pany for approximately $6,000 and the finance company had withheld
$3,000 of that amount until the machine was completely operational.
Because the seller did not schedule the contract as an asset, the bank-
ruptcy case was closed without any action with respect to it In the
finance company's later interpleader action, in which no one manifested
an interest in having the bankruptcy case opened, it was held that:(1) notwithstanding § 70b, the bankruptcy trustee should not be deemed
to have rejected a contract of which he was unaware; (2) title to the
contract vested in the trustee under § 70a even though it was not
scheduled; (3) the seller was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery
equal to two-thirds of the withheld sum (which was consumed by a fed-
eral tax lien for undischarged withholding and social security taxes);
and (4) the buyer was entitled to the balance.
See also Entron, Inc. v. General Cablevision, 435 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.
1970), holding that the implied warranty provisions of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code are applicable to a contract to supply ma-
terials and construct a cable television system, and Burge Ice Machine
Co. v. Weiss, 219 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955), holding the implied warranty
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act applicable to a contract to supply
and install refrigeration equipment.
156. In connection with § 2-501, which provides rules for determin-
ing when goods are identified to the contract "[iJn the absence of ex-
plicit agreement," Comment 3 advises:
An "explicit" agreement, however, need not necessarily be found
in the terms used in the particular transaction. Thus, where a
usage of the trade has previously been made explicit by re-
duction to a standard set of "rules and regulations" currently
incorporated by reference into the contracts of the parties, a
relevant provision of those "rules and regulations" is "explicit"
within the meaning of this section.
Even without express incorporation, §§ 1-205(3) and (4) provide that
a usage of trade can be used to "give particular meaning to and supple-
ment or qualify" but not to contradict, the terms of an agreement.
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had, the answer to that question must be found in nonbank-
ruptcy law. But nothing in the Code provides the answer for all
cases. Repossession of goods is not one of the remedies listed in
the Code's general arsenal for unsecured sellers. 15 7 Aside from
§ 2-702, which would in some circumstances entitle a seller on
credit to reclaim from an insolvent buyer without regard to the
location of title (and which I have elsewhere argued should not
be applicable in bankruptcy 5 8 ) only § 2-507(2) seems to bear on
the problem. Without regard to the location of title, that section
provides:
Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to
the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against
the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his
making the payment due.
One bankruptcy court has read this provision to mean that
the seller on a cash sale can recover his goods when the buyer's
check for the price bounces because of his bankruptcy, and has
concluded (although the Code is completely silent on the subject)
that this right to reclaim is good against "any creditor" of the
buyer and hence against the buyer's bankruptcy trustee. 5 ' No
consideration was given to whether this conclusion was contrary
to the Bankruptcy Act's policy against preferences0 " or (perhaps
because the seller had fully performed) to its policy of permitting
the trustee of the buyer to reject executory contracts.' 0'
Except for the unsecured credit seller who has successfully
retained title despite surrender of possession, the Code provides
no repossession remedy. Perhaps this is because such a seller has
entered into a transaction outside the scope of the Code, as was
earlier suggested, 10 2 in which event he would have to look to non-
Code law for his remedies. Or perhaps, even though his trans-
action is covered by the Code, his remedies are not confined to
those which the Code expressly confers. Perhaps he can supple-
ment his remedies by non-Code law, although when the Code
157. UNIFORM COMIERCIAL CODE §§ 2-703 through 2-710.
158. Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1
N. MEx. L. REv. 435, 451-59 (1971).
159. In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Another
bankruptcy court was apparently ready to reach the same conclusion,
but gave effect to some rather remarkable interstitial legislation in
Comment 3 to § 2-507 indicating that the ten-day limit on demands
for reclamation imposed on credit sellers by § 2-702 is applicable also
to cash sellers under § 2-507. In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Va. 1968).
160. See note 100 supra.
161. See note 103 supra.
162. See text accompanying notes 150-54, supra.
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speaks in § 1-103 of "principles" which may supplement Code
provisions it seems to imply substantive law rather than the
law of remedies. But when a court undertakes to determine
whether to create or perpetuate a special remedy for a seller
solely because he has retained title to the goods, it might feel
some restraint in view of the effort in both Article 2 and (as will
shortly appear) Article 9 of the Code to eliminate the significance
formerly attributed to title.
Since the Code also contemplates that "explicit agreement"
may cause title to pass to the buyer before the seller has com-
pleted his performance with reference to delivery,10 3 the buyer
may also assert a right based on his title to claim goods which he
has not yet received when the bankruptcy trustee of the seller re-
jects a contract of sale.
Here again, the claim finds no support in the Code, which
authorizes the buyer to claim the goods in only three situations,
all without regard to the location of title. Section 2-502 gives
buyers who have advanced all or a part of the purchase price a
right in some circumstances to claim the goods from an insol-
vent seller. 6 4 Section 2-716(1) authorizes specific performance
for the buyer "where the goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances."'' 6 5 And § 2-716(3) gives the buyer "a right of
replevin for goods identified to the contract if, after reasonable
effort, he is unable to effect cover for such goods' 6 6 or the circum-
stances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or
163. UIFORM CONMERCL. CODE § 2-401(2). Under § 2-401 (1) title
cannot pass prior to identification of the goods to the contract, an occa-
sion which, under § 2-501(1), will in any event give the buyer "a spe-
cial property and an insurable interest" in the goods. And by § 2-401(3), unless "otherwise explicitly agreed," where delivery is to be made
without moving the goods, if the goods are already identified at the
the time of contracting and no documents are to be delivered, title passes
at the time of contracting.
164. Elsewhere I have argued that this provision should not be
given effect in bankruptcy and, specifically, that where the contract re-
mains executory because the buyer has advanced only a part of the
price, § 2-502 cannot deprive the seller's trustee of his option to assume
or reject the contract. Countryman, supra note 158, at 435-51.
165. Comment 1 compounds the ambiguity of the statutory lan-
guage: "without intending to impair in any way the exercise of the
court's sound discretion in the matter, this Article seeks to further a
more liberal attitude than some courts have shown in connection with
the specific performance of contracts of sale."
166. "After a breach [by the seller] the buyer may 'cover' by mak-
ing in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable pur-
chase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from
the seller" (§ 2-712(1) ).
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if the goods have been shipped under reservation 1 7 and satis-
faction of the security interest in them has been made or ten-
dered."
The buyer who can establish his right to invoke these provi-
sions for reclamation, specific performance or replevin may suc-
cessfully claim the goods from the seller's rejecting trustee if he
can persuade the bankruptcy court (1) that his rights are superior
to those of the seller's levying creditors, whose status the trustee
acquires under § 70c' 18 and (2) that enforcement of those rights
is not contrary to the Bankruptcy Act's policy against preferential
treatment'6 9 or its policy permitting the trustee of the seller to
reject any contract which remain executory. 170 But the buyer who
cannot qualify under these Code provisions and who bases his
claim to the goods solely on his title to them will have to estab-
lish his claim by creating or resurrecting some non-Code law
which gives more significance to title than does the Code.
Finally, what of the case the Code draftsmen apparently re-
garded as typical, or at least as commonplace-the case in which
title passes to the buyer on the seller's performance with respect
to the physical delivery of the goods and in which any reserva-
tion of title by the seller thereafter is effective only to reserve a
security interest? On the analysis suggested here, such a con-
tract should not be viewed as executory since the seller has fully
performed. Rather, the contract is similar to a purchase money
mortgage on real estate.' 17 On the seller's bankruptcy, his se-
167. "Where the seller has identified goods to the contract by or
before shipment: (a) his procurement of a negotiable bill of lading to
his own order or otherwise reserves in him a security interest in the
goods .... (b) a non-negotiable bill of lading to himself or his nomi-
nee reserves possession of the goods as security . . . ." § 2-505 (1) ).
Under § 2-401(2) such a reservation of a security interest will not pre-
vent the passage of title.
168. The Code is unclear on the point. By § 2-402(1), "rights of
unsecured creditors of the seller with respect to goods which have
been identified to a contract for sale are subject to the buyer's rights to
recover the goods" under § 2-716. Since "creditor" is defined in § 1-201
(12) to include "a general creditor, a secured creditor, [and] a lien credi-
tor," the "unsecured creditors" referred to in § 2-402(1) apparently are
not "lien creditors" and the rights of the latter may not be subject to
the buyer's right to recover the goods under § 2-716. But only in Arti-
cle 9 is the term "lien creditor" defined. Section 9-301 (3) states that
a lien creditor is "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property
involved by attachment, levy or the like" and that definition is only for
the purpose of identifying the "lien creditor" who may defeat an unper-
fected security interest under § 9-301 (1) (b).
169. See note 100 supra.
170. See note 105 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 123-26 supra.
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cured claim against the buyer would constitute an asset which
his trustee could collect or sell. On the buyer's bankruptcy, as-
suming that the seller had perfected his security interest under
Article 9 of the Code,172 the trustee of the buyer would take only
the buyer's equity, which he should be able to preserve in the
same manner as does the trustee of a real estate mortgagor.' 1 3
There is much in the pre-Code cases to support these con-
clusions. With no suggestion that executory contracts were
thought to be involved, the courts have permitted trustees of
bankrupts who had given valid security interests in personal
property to redeem the property,174 to sell it subject to the se-
curity interest,175 or to claim the bankrupt's equity from the
proceeds of a liquidation of the property in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding 176 or at a nonjudicial sale.17
For the most part the treatment of conditional sales con-
tracts has been consistent with the treatment of other security
interests in personalty. All the conditional sales contract cases
seem to have arisen on the seller's petition to reclaim the col-
lateral, which is an appropriate way for the seller to raise the is-
172. For security interests "arising solely" under Article 2, such as
the one acquired under § 2-505 by shipment under reservation (see
note 167, supra), neither a security agreement nor a filed financing
statement is required by § 9-113 until the buyer lawfully obtains pos-
session. Apparently, the security interest which the seller obtains by
attempting to reserve title after delivery is not regarded as "arising
solely" under Article 2, since it is provided for by § 1-201(37) as well
as § 2-401(1). See U~woim Con mlmcrAL CODE § 9-113, Comment 5.
173. See text accompanying notes 127-30 supra.
174. Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.
1945) (pledge of notes); In re International Fuel & Iron Co., 21 F.2d 598
(3d Cir. 1927) (assignment of contract claim); Seattle Rialto Theatre
Co. v. Heritage, 4 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1925) (pledge of corporate stock);
Van Kirk v. Vermont Slate Co., 140 F. 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1905) (pledge of
insurance policies).
175. Gotkin v. Korn, 182 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (chattel mort-
gage); John Schaap & Sons Drug Co. v. Rone, 19 F.2d 517 (8th Cir.
1927) (chattel mortgage); In re Haywood Wagon Co., 219 F. 655 (2d Cir.
1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 625 (1915) (chattel mortgage).
176. Drybrough v. Ware, 111 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1940) (chattel mort-
gage); In re E.A. Kinsey Co., 184 F. 694 (6th Cir. 1911) (lien of unspeci-
fied nature). See also Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement,
336 U.S. 118 (1949).
177. Middleton v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 35 F.2d 851 (3d
Cir. 1929) (pledge of securities). See also Major Appliance Co. v. Gib-
son Refrigerator Sales Corp., 254 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1958), holding that
the trustee may maintain a conversion action against a secured creditor




sue whether the buyer's trustee should abandon the property.1 78
Where the trustee indicated that he did not wish to redeem the
property, reclamation was granted. 17 9 In other cases reclama-
tion was approved unless the trustee elected to redeem. 18 0 In
still other cases in which the trustee unsuccessfully asserted that
the conditional sales contract was invalid as to him but made no
suggestion that he be allowed to redeem, reclamation was al-
lowed on a finding that the contract was valid. 8 1 Where the
seller under a valid contract had repossessed the goods before
bankruptcy, he was allowed to retain them, at least where they
were worth less than the balance of the purchase price owing.'
8 2
This result was consonant with the treatment of the holder of a
valid chattel mortgage acting prior to bankruptcy who repos-
sessed mortgaged goods worth less than the mortgage debt and
was allowed to retain them.18 3
But these were all straight bankruptcy cases where the
holder of a valid conditional sales contract or other security in-
terest is entitled, in one way or another, to a fairly prompt cash
realization on his security. A different situation is presented
under the rehabilitory provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, under
178. Cf. Quinn v. Gardner, 32 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1929), where the
referee, on petition of the holders of real estate and chattel mortgages,
ordered the trustee to abandon the mortgaged property. After first rul-
ing that the mortgages were invalid as to the trustee, Quinn v. Union
Nat'l Bank, 32 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1929), the court reversed the abandon-
ment order solely for that reason.
179. In re Terrill, 246 F. 743 (8th Cir. 1917).
180. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268, 274 (1915);
Miller v. McCray Refrigerator Co., 130 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1942); In re
Abell, 19 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1927); In re Wegman Piano Co., 221 F. 128
(N.D.N.Y. 1918).
181. York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906); In re Curb Serv-
ice Laundry & Dry Cleaning, Inc., 145 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1944); Great W.
Stage Equip. Co. v. Iles, 70 F.2d 197 (10th Cir. 1934); In re I.S. Remson
Mfg. Co., 232 F. 594 (2d Cir. 1916); In re White's Express Co., 215 F. 894
(2d Cir. 1914). Cf. Shook v. Levi, 240 F. 121 (9th Cir. 1917), where the
conditional seller established the validity of his contract and was al-
lowed to reclaim, but the trustee of the buyer was held entitled to a re-
turn of the partially paid purchase price to the extent that it exceeded
the reasonable value of the use of the property by the buyer.
Of course, where the trustee of the buyer succeeded in establishing
the invalidity of the conditional sales contract, the seller was not al-
lowed to reclaim. In re Master Knitting Corp., 7 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1925).
182. Bryant v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 214 U.S. 279 (1909).
183. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 (1905). See also Hum-
phrey v. Tatman, 198 U.S. 91, 92 (1905), where the bankruptcy trustee of
a chattel mortgagor failed in his effort to recover, "without payment of




some of which Congress has authorized the rehabilitation plan
to deal with secured claims in a manner which, at the least, post-
pones their maturities, 8 4 and under all of which the bankruptcy
court is given exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the
debtor wherever located.'i 5 Under these provisions, the court is
authorized to enjoin until final decree any act or proceeding to
foreclose on the security. 8 6
In considering the rehabilitory provisions applicable to rail-
road reorganizations in § 77, the Supreme Court in the Rock Is-
land case held that pledgees in possession of pledged securities
might be enjoined from selling their collateral despite the debt-
or's post-petition default where the sale might hinder, delay or
obstruct the reorganization. 8 7 However, the Court suggested
that the result might be different in a straight bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.
But where conditional sales contracts were involved, the
tyranny of the title label for a time obtruded. Three months
after the Rock Island decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in the Lake's Laundry case 8 concluded that where
184. This is true of most secured claims in railroad reorganizations
under § 77 § 77(b) ), other corporate reorganizations under Chapter X(§§ 106(1), 216(1) ), and real property arrangements under Chapter XII
(§§ 406(1) and (2), 461(1) and (2) ). It is also true of claims secured by
personalty under Chapter XIII (§§ 606(1), 646(1) and (2)).
185. § 77(a), Chapter X § 111), Chapter XI (§ 311), Chapter XII(§ 411), Chapter XIII (§ 611).
186. While what is now § 77 (j) expressly authorizes only a stay of
"any judicial proceeding" to enforce a lien, § 2a(15) authorizing "such
orders ... as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions
of this Act" was held sufficient to empower a § 77 court to enjoin non-
judicial sale by pledgees of securities. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 US. 648, 677-78 (1935).
The other provisions are not limited to judicial proceedings. Chapter
X (§§ 113, 116(4), 148), Chapter XI (§ 314), Chapter XI (§§ 414, 428),
Chapter XlI (§ 614).
187. Continental Illinois Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, LL &
Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 677-78 (1935). The Court recognized that "[ijt
may be... that during the period of restraint the collateral will decline
in value," and emphasized that it was sanctioning only "reasonable de-
lay" during which the reorganization should be "speedily determined."
Id. at 685. Ten years after the injunction was issued, and after the dis-
trict court had approved a plan under which the pledgees were to re-
ceive new bonds and stock in the reorganized debtor, one group of
pledgees was paid in cash and the other group was allowed to sell its
collateral to purchasers who became entitled to the new securities al-
lowed under the plan on the pledgee's claims. See Chicago, ILL & Pac.
Ry. v. Fleming, 157 F.2d 241, 247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 780
(1946).
188. In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326, 102 A.L.R. 247 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 622 (1935).
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a laundry operator was in default under the conditional sales
contracts on its machinery at the time it filed its petition for
reorganization under § 77B (the predecessor of Chapter X), the
sellers were entitled to reclaim the machinery. True, the Rock
Island decision indicated that if the sellers "had only a lien upon
the property, as they would were they mortgagees," they could be
enjoined. And § 77B,189 like § 77, authorized a modification of the
rights of secured creditors, 190 gave the bankruptcy court exclusive
jurisdiction of the property of the debtor wherever located,'"
authorized it to enjoin "judicial proceeding to enforce any lien
upon the estate" until final decree,192 and provided that the plan
might "deal with all or any part of the property of the debtor."'193
But the court could not read § 77B to "ignore the distinction be-
tween property mortgaged by a debtor and property held by a
debtor as conditional vendee," the latter being "the property of
the conditional vendor," and "not property of the debtor," until
the contract price was paid. While the court did "leave open all
questions as to final disposition of the proceeds of such equities
in the property as the debtor may be found to have when it is
repossessed and dealt with as the laws of New York provide,"
the proceeds of those equities seemed unlikely to be sufficient
to make a reorganization feasible, as Judge Learned Hand pointed
out in dissent.19
4
Even though this approach was somewhat modified in the
White Plains case wherein a conditional buyer in default at the
time of his Chapter Xr petition was permitted to redeem his
equipment within a "reasonable time" on payment of some $5,000
due under an acceleration clause,195 it held little hope for the
189. 48 Stat. 911 (1934).
190. § 77B(b) (1).
191. § 77B(a).
192. § 77B(c) (10).
193. § 77B(b) (10).
194. In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326, 328 (2d Cir.) cert. de-
nied, 296 U.S. 622 (1935).
195. In re White Plains Ice Serv., Inc., 109 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1940).
See also In re Burgemeister Brewing Co., 84 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1936),
reaching the same conclusion in a § 77B case. In Kagan v. Indus.
Washing Mach. Corp., 182 F.2d 139, 142 (1st Cir. 1950), the court's rhe-
toric was more extreme than its ruling. There, in the straight bank-
ruptcy proceeding following an abortive Chapter X effort of a default-
ing conditional buyer, wherein the trustee had sold the collateral, it
was said:
it being conceded . . . that the bankrupt defaulted in payment,
and hence that the condition of the sale was broken, it fol-
lows that title to the machine remained in the vendor .... and




salvation of businesses unable to raise the full balance of the
purchase price for their equipment where that price was secured
by the title of the conditional sale rather than the lien of the
chattel mortgage.
With the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Second Circuit has reconsidered what it wrought in Lake's Laun-
dry and White Plains. Section 9-202 of the Code, sharing a theme
adopted in Article 2,190 provides: "Each provision of [Article 9]
with regard to rights, obligations and remedies applies whether
title to collateral is in the secured party or the debtor." An in-
explicably placed comment elaborates on the significance of this
provision:
A case may be put in which the liquidation value of an in-
solvent estate would be enhanced by disposing of all the debt-
or's property (including that subject to a security interest) in
the liquidation proceeding and in which, if a secured party re-
possesses and sells that part of the property which he holds as
collateral, the remainder will have little or no resale value. In
such a case the question may arise whether a particular court
has the power to control the manner of disposition... in order
to preserve the estate for the benefit of creditors. Such a power
is no doubt inherent in a Federal bankruptcy court, and perhaps
also in other courts of equity administering insolvent estates.
Traditionally it was not exercised where the secured party
claimed under a title retention device, such as conditional sale
or trust receipt [citing Lake's Laundry and White Plains]. But
since this Article adopts neither a "title" nor a "lien" theory of
security interests .... the granting or denying of, for example,
petitions of reclamation in bankruptcy proceedings should not
be influenced by speculations as to whether the secured party
had "title" to the collateral or '"merely a lien".19 7
In Yale Express,19 s a Chapter X case involving chattel mort-
gages on the debtor's trucks rather than conditional sales con-
tracts, the court took note both of § 9-202 and of the above-
quoted comment and concluded that its earlier approach, though
perhaps "defensible at the time," was no longer "in keeping with
the developments in the body of recent commercial law."1 09
Since the Code
has abolished the technical distinctions between the various
security devices, the federal bankruptcy courts should no longer
But the court affirmed a ruling below that the vendor was entitled to
the balance of the purchase price with interest from the due date to the
extent that the proceeds of the trustee's sale were sufficient to cover
the interest.
196. See discussion in text preceding note 137 supra.
197. UNIFORM COM.EnCI CODE § 9-507, Comment 1. In the 1972
revision of the Code, this comment is revised to take account of the
developments discussed in text accompanying notes 198-200 infra.
198. In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 370 F.2d 433, 436-38 (2d Cir. 1966).
199. Id. at 437.
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feel compelled to engage in the purely theoretical exercise of lo-
cating "title" . . . Equitable considerations and the substance
of the transaction should govern, regardless of the form of the
security agreement 200
After a remand and findings by the Chapter X court that the
otherwise reasonable prospects of reorganization would be frus-
trated if the chattel mortgagee's reclamation petition were
granted, it was held that reclamation was properly denied with-
out payment of rentals to the mortgagee (since other secured
creditors would be equally entitled to rental payments and thus
reorganization would also be frustrated), at least where the
trustee had offered to value the mortgagee's collateral presently
so that its position in any Chapter X reorganization would not
be prejudiced by depreciation.20 -
But if one court has brought its conception of the remedies
available to a conditional seller of goods abreast of commercial
developments, a few others seem to persist in a conception of
conditional sales contracts which cannot be reconciled with the
treatment of other contracts under which one party has fully
performed. After some earlier intimations to that effect,2 0 2 In re
Pagliaro,20 3 approved by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, held that the bankruptcy trustee of a buyer who did not act
within the time fixed by § 70b to assume or reject a conditional
sales contract had rejected it. Hence, he could not maintain a
conversion action against the seller who had repossessed the
goods after bankruptcy without the permission of the bank-
ruptcy court and had sold them for more than the balance due
under the contract, since a defaulting buyer could not have
maintained such an action against the seller. To the trustee's ar-
200. Id. at 437-38.
201. In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967).
The court in In re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J.
1965), an abortive Chapter XI proceeding which had ended in bank-
ruptcy, found that the seller of inventory had valid trust receipts (and
was affirmed on an appeal by the bankruptcy trustee which raised this
point only by In re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1966)), and concluded that the seller should be allowed to reclaim his
collateral, not because he had retained title but because U.C.C. § 9-503
provides that any secured party on default may repossess the collateral.
202. In re Daterson Publishing Co., 188 F. 64 (3d Cir. 1931) and In
re Roger Williams Bldg. Corp., 99 F.2d 212 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 307
U.S. 635 (1939), assumed that conditional sales contracts for goods are
executory contracts which the trustee of the buyer may assume or re-
ject.
203. 99 F. Supp. 548, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
Costello v. Golden, 196 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1952).
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gument that § 70b applies "only to instances where performance
in future is owing on both sides," the court responded: "No au-
thority was cited and none can be found which applies that re-
stricted construction to the section"20 4 (a reply which could not
be given today2 0 5). The court cited cases recognizing the trus-
tee's right to redeem the property subject to the contract for the
proposition that "[1]ong before [§ 70b] was promulgated the
right of a trustee to adopt or reject a conditional sales contract
was recognized." 2006
Following this decision another bankruptcy court in the
same circuit found that the bankruptcy trustee of a conditional
buyer, by selling the goods covered by a conditional sales con-
tract, had assumed the contract and was therefore liable to the
conditional seller only for some $500 of the unpaid purchase
price rather than the $5,200 proceeds of sale.20 7 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit has also found a conditional sales
contract to have been assumed and has therefore reached a sim-
ilar conclusion where, on the trustee's opposition to the seller's
reclamation petition, the referee found the contract valid but also
found that the debtor had a valuable equity and ordered the con-
tract "paid off" from the proceeds of sale of the collateral by the
trustee.2 08  Very recently, in Daning v. Brunswick Corp.,20
the Ninth Circuit concluded that, where the trustee of the vendee
under conditional sales contracts does not act within the time
allowed by § 70b, he has rejected the contracts and cannot there-
after sell the property covered by them.
Although the results in these cases are perhaps correct, the
analysis and the terminology employed seem faulty. Proceeding
on the premise, erroneous I believe, that the conditional sales
contracts before them were executory contracts within the mean-
ing of § 70b, the courts have confused the trustee's right to re-
deem the property under the security interest which he takes
from the bankrupt under § 70a with his right to assume executory
contracts under § 70b. Furthermore, they have confused his
right to abandon as valueless the bankrupt's equity in collat-
eral, which he takes under § 70a, with his right to reject execu-
tory contracts under § 70b. Although the consequences may have
204. Id.
205. See text at notes 64-71 supra.
206. 99 F. Supp. at 552.
207. In re McCormick Lumber Corp., 144 F. Supp. 804 (D. Ore. 1956).
208. In re Forgee Metal Products, Inc., 229 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1956).
209. 466 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1972).
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been the same in each case if the court had spoken of redemption
rather than assumption, or of abandonment rather than rejec-
tion, focus on the proper concept would produce a sharper and
perhaps different resolution of the issue. If the courts in the
Pagliano210 and Danning21' cases had been looking for abandon-
ment of property rather than rejection of an executory contract,
they would not have treated expiration of the time prescribed
by § 70b as conclusive of the issue.
As much cannot be said for the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Smith v. Hill,212 which held that, where a conditional seller of
real estate and personal property had a foreclosure action pend-
ing and had a receiver appointed in a state court at the time the
conditional buyer filed a Chapter XI petition, it was error for the
Chapter XI court to order the state receiver to turn over the
property to the debtor in possession. The Supreme Court had
previously held213 in a straight bankruptcy proceeding that the
power given the bankruptcy court by § 2a(21) in the exercise of
its summary jurisdiction to order receivers to turn over property
in their possession was inapplicable to a receiver of rents and
profits appointed before bankruptcy in the foreclosure of a valid
real estate mortgage. In a straight bankruptcy proceeding, the
summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court extends only to
property in its custody. The court cannot enjoin the continuation
of a foreclosure proceeding by a state court which had acquired
custody of the property prior to bankruptcy. 214 Hence the Court
concluded that since the bankruptcy court could not halt the state
foreclosure action, to apply § 2a(21) "would mean that the fore-
closure would go on apace in the state court while the funds col-
lected by the receiver would be turned over to the bankruptcy
court for administration, ' '215 a division of authority between state
and federal courts which Congress could hardly have intended.
The Ninth Circuit could find "no support in either reason or au-
thority for applying a different rule in an action by a conditional
vendor to enforce his rights against a defaulting vendee under a
conditional sales contract. ' 210  But in reaching that conclusion
210. 99 F. Supp. 548, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Costello v. Golden, 196 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1952), discussed in text
accompanying note 203 supra.
211. 466 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1972), discussed in text accompanying
note 209, supra.
212. 317 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1963).
213. Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515 (1943).
214. Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931).
215. Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 520 (1943).
216. Smith v. Hill, 317 F.2d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 57:439
CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY
the court completely ignored the provisions of § 311 giving the
Chapter XI court "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his
property, wherever located," and of § 314 expressly authorizing
that court to "enjoin or stay until final decree any act or the
commencement or continuation of any proceeding to enforce any
lien upon the property of a debtor." It also ignored the argument,
on which it has vacillated in other cases before and since,2 7 that
the effect of the former provision is to extend the summary juris-
diction of the Chapter XI court to all property in which the debtor
has an interest, whether or not the property is in the custody of
that court.2 18 Instead, it suggested that the debtor in possession
might protect his equity by assuming the contract and interven-
ing in the state foreclosure action to preserve any right of re-
demption he might have under state law. By thus ignoring the
provisions of Sections 311 and 314, the Ninth Circuit seems to
have brought itself, at least in cases where the conditional seller
has repossessed before the Chapter XI proceeding starts, close to
a position the Second Circuit was to renounce three years later." 10
217. See Comment, Summary Jurisdiction Under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act: Collier v. Remington, 59 Geo. L.J. 1395, 1400-06 (1971).
218. 8 W. COLLIER, BANaupTcy 3.02 (14th ed. 1971). A contrary
view is asserted in 9 H. mNGTOrN, BANKRUPTCY §§ 3572-74 (6th ed.
J. Henderson 1955), where it is argued that the only purpose of § 311
of the Act is to extend the territorial jurisdiction of the Chapter XI
court but that its jurisdiction is otherwise confined to property in its
custody.
219. In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 307 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966), dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 198 supra. True, Yale Express was a
Chapter X case where the bankruptcy court's position is even stronger
because, unlike Chapter XI, the secured creditor's claim can be brought
under the plan. But Chapter XI courts acting under §§ 311 and 314
have enjoined: (1) the continuation of nonjudicial sales of real estate
under deeds of trust, In re Victor Builders, Inc., 418 F.2d 880 (9th Cir.
1969); In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961); (2) commence-
ment of judicial proceedings to foreclose under deeds of trust on realty,
In re Victor Builders, Inc., supra; and (3) the commencement of pro-
ceedings to foreclose chattel mortgages, Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Gross,
208 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1953); In re Atlantic Steel Prod. Corp., 31 F. Supp.
408 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). Cf. In re Holiday Lodge, Inc., 300 F.2d 516 (7th
Cir. 1962). And under the similar provisions of §§ 611 and 614 of
Chapter XIII, where the wage earner's plan may not deal with claims
secured by realty, the courts have enjoined the commencement of fore-
closure proceedings under mortgages and deeds of trust on realty. Hal-
lenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); In re
Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284 (WMD. Mo. 1972); In re Howard, 344 F.
Supp. 1138 (E.D. Ark. 1971); In re Pizzolato, 281 F. Supp. 109 (WM.
Ark. 1967); In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ala. 1962). See also
In re 'W'illett, 265 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
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